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ARBITRATION PRACTICE 
Security for Costs:  
Trends and Developments in Swiss Arbitral Case Law 
BERNHARD BERGER* 
I.  Introduction  
The concept of security for costs (cautio judicatum solvi) is well 
established in state court litigation for centuries.1 Indeed, it even has its roots 
in Roman law:  
“Ab eius vero parte, cum quo agitur, si quidem alieno nomine aliquis 
interveniat, omnimodo satisdari debet, quia nemo alienae rei sine 
satisdatione defensor idoneus intellegitur. (…).”2  
“Iudicatum solvi stipulatio tres clausulas in unum collatas habet: de re 
iudicata, de re defendenda, de dolo malo.”3  
In spite of this longstanding tradition, the cautio judicatum solvi faced 
difficulties to find its way into the field of arbitration. Before 1990, only very 
few decisions became public at all.4 As of 1990, however, the issue seems to 
have arisen more frequently, as the following table with decisions rendered 
by arbitral tribunals with their seat in Switzerland reveals:  
                                                     
*  Dr. iur., LL.M., Attorney at law, Kellerhals Anwälte, Bern.  
1 Cf. e.g. Gesetzbuch über das gerichtliche Verfahren in Civil-Rechtssachen für den Canton Bern vom 
26. März 1821, 49. Satzung („Rechtsversicherung“). For its part, this provision relied upon a 
predecessor in the Gerichtssatzung für die Stadt Bern vom 9. Christmonat 1761 (III. Teil, VI. Titel). 
Under these rules, Claimant had to provide security for costs, inter alia, when he was insolvent or had 
its domicile or habitual residence outside the Canton of Bern.  
2 G. Inst., 4, 101. Translation: “However, the party against whom an action is brought must always give 
security if another person is acting on his behalf, for no one is considered to be a sufficient defendant 
of another person’s case without security. (…).” This text shows that it was normally the respondent 
who had to provide security for costs, while today, it is normally the claimant. This was so because 
the cognitor or procurator, although having been mandated by the defendant as his legal 
representative, was considered to defend the action in his own name, for Roman law had not yet 
developed the concept of “direct representation” as it is nowadays commonly accepted (cf. e.g. 
Articles 32 et seq. of the Swiss Code of Obligations).  
3 Dig. 46, 7, 6. Translation: “The stipulation judicatum solvi is composed of three clauses: for 
satisfaction of the judgment, for defending the action, and for fraud.”  
4 Cf. e.g. NAI Arbitration, Interim Award of 12 July 1985, XI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
(1986), p. 189. Decision of an Arbitral Tribunal under the Rules of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce 
of 25 June 1956, SJZ 54 (1958) p. 92.  
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In spite of the increased interest that the cautio judicatum solvi has 
attracted in international arbitration over the last two decades, a traditional 
reluctance – sometimes even outright refusal – to deal with it and especially 
awarding it has remained. The present compilation of further decisions 
rendered by arbitral tribunals with their seat in Switzerland between 2003 and 
2009 (cf. at p. 15 et seq. below) confirms this trend: the availability of 
security for costs in international arbitration is specific and limited, not least 
due to the inherent increased risks in cross-border trade and commerce as 
compared with mere domestic transactions. However, the more recent case 
law also confirms, and thereby settles, certain issues that had been discussed 
controversially in legal writing and earlier case law.  
II.  Legal Qualification of an Order for Security for Costs  
For an arbitral tribunal with its seat in Switzerland most decisions 
published below confirm that the legal basis to order security for costs is to be 
found in Article 183 PILS (and/or in a corresponding provision of the 
applicable arbitration rules). In other words, one may state that it is by now 
well-established practice that a request for security for costs is considered as a 
form of an application for a provisional or conservatory measure. There is one 
decision in which the tribunal, in addition to Article 183 PILS, also considered 
Article 182 PILS as a valid basis empowering it to review an application for 
cautio judicatum solvi (Order of 19 December 2008, p. 47 below, at para. 
5.2.9). In another decision the tribunal saw the appropriate basis in Article 182 
PILS only (Order of April 2009, p. 59 below, at para. 30).  
Indeed, many of the newer decisions confirm that the legal 
requirements for ordering security for costs are the “classic” requirements 
that must be met for any order of provisional or conservatory measures:  
– Existence of a potential, future claim for reimbursement of costs 
worthy of protection (so-called Verfügungsanspruch, titularité du 
droit invoqué). In other words, the applicant must demonstrate, with 
a reasonable degree of certainty (glaubhaft machen), that it will 
have good title to a claim for reimbursement of its costs in case the 
dispute should be decided in its favour (so-called fumus boni iuris). 
For the avoidance of doubt, this test does not include a prima facie 
assessment of the outcome of the dispute (cf. on this point the 
Decision of 19 December 2008, p. 47 below, at para. 6.2.4).  
– Immediate danger of being deprived of such claim (so-called 
Verfügungsgrund, motif qui justifie la mesure). The applicant must 
ARBITRATION PRACTICE – SECURITY FOR COSTS 
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also show, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that it would 
suffer irreparable harm if the order for security for costs were not 
granted immediately (so-called periculum in mora).  
In view of the above, the recent case law should also put an end to the 
debate on the question of whether the decision of an arbitral tribunal to award 
security for costs should take the form of an order or an award. The reasons 
for this debate are obvious: if it is an award, the decision is within the ambit 
of the New York Convention and, thus, can be recognized and enforced 
abroad, otherwise not. In order to overcome this difficulty, the drafters of 
certain arbitration rules thought it would be useful to state that interim 
measures and orders contemplated under their rules (including security for 
costs) may “take the form of an interim award” (see e.g. Article 46 (c) WIPO 
Rules). We do not believe that arbitration rules can make such a 
determination with binding effect. Rather, the courts of the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought will always examine with unfettered 
powers of review whether the decision before them is indeed an “arbitral 
award” within the meaning of the New York Convention. In any event, under 
Swiss arbitration law, it can be considered as settled that a decision awarding 
a cautio judicatum solvi is a mere procedural order without any final and 
binding effect (no res judicata). This also means that the arbitral tribunal is 
free to reconsider, amend, or revoke its decision upon request of one or the 
other party at any time.5  
III.  Factual Circumstances for Ordering Security for Costs  
With regards to the factual circumstances which may justify an order 
for security for costs, two different categories emerge from the decisions 
published below.  
The first category of circumstances may be summarized as: serious 
deterioration of the opponent’s financial status compared to the time when 
the arbitration agreement was concluded. Within the ambit of this first 
category, arbitral tribunals have decided, inter alia, the following:  
– Security for costs was granted in the context of a claimant-
company with continuing business inactivity and a balance sheet 
                                                     
5  See e.g. Art. 17D UNCITRAL Model Law: “The arbitral tribunal may modify, suspend or terminate 
an interim measure or a preliminary order it has granted, upon application of any party or, in 
exceptional circumstances and upon prior notice to the parties, on the arbitral tribunal’s own 
initiative.” Cf. also Decision of 19 December 2008, p. 47 below, at para. 7.7.  
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showing a manifest over-indebtedness and practically no liquid 
assets. The arbitral tribunal justified its decision, in part as follows: 
“If a party has become manifestly insolvent and therefore is likely 
relying on funds from third parties in order to finance its own costs 
of the arbitration, the right to have access to arbitral justice can only 
be granted under the condition that those third parties are also ready 
and willing to secure the other party’s reasonable costs to be 
incurred” (Decision of 4 July 2008, p. 37 at para. 21).  
– Security for costs was denied in a case where the respondent had 
contracted with an offshore shell company having its domicile in the 
Caribbean, but then argued that this would justify to order a cautio 
judicatum solvi. The arbitral tribunal considered: « Enfin – et ce point 
est décisif – une partie qui entre dans une relation contractuelle avec 
un partenaire dont la solidité financière n’est pas garantie prend un 
risque, y compris celui de ne pas recouvrer des dépens en cas de 
litige. Il se justifie d’ordonner des mesures destinées à pallier ce 
risque uniquement s’il a augmenté entre la conclusion du contrat et 
le procès arbitral de façon considérable et imprévisible » (Decision 
of 29 May 2009, p. 71 below, at para. 2.3.6 
– Security for costs was denied in the context of a complex multi-party 
arbitration involving two claimants and sixteen respondents. In a 
parallel proceeding before a state court in a foreign jurisdiction, 
which involved some but not all of the same parties, a freezing order 
had been issued against the claimants enjoining them from disposing 
of certain assets. However, it was not proven that certain other assets 
of the claimants were also within the scope of the freezing order and 
that the banks in which those assets were held “… would be 
unwilling – either de facto or de jure – to transfer assets relating to 
the present arbitration” (Decision of 19 December 2008, p. 47 below, 
at para. 7.2.8). The tribunal therefore concluded that the respondents 
“… have failed to establish with reasonable probability an impending 
injury to their entitlements or rights or a threat of irreparable harm to 
them” (at para. 7.3.1 of the Decision).  
                                                     
6  English translation: “After all – and this point is decisive – a party which enters into a contractual 
relationship with a partner with no guaranteed financial solidity takes a risk, including the one of not 
recovering the legal costs in case of dispute. It is justified to order measures intended to mitigate such 
risk only if it has increased between the conclusion of the contract and the arbitral proceedings in a 
considerable and unforeseeable way.” 
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The second category can be generalized in the following terms: bad 
faith manoeuvres of a party being specifically intended to frustrate the other 
party’s potential future cost claim. Within the ambit of this second category, 
arbitral tribunals decided the following:  
– Security for costs was granted in a case where the claimant was an 
offshore company registered in the Republic of Panama which had 
acquired the claim in dispute by way of assignment against no 
apparent compensation and without showing cause for such 
assignment. The assignment was dated and signed only 15 days 
before the filing of the request for arbitration. The arbitral tribunal 
considered that, in view of all of the circumstances, it “cannot but 
assume that at least one of the reasons for such assignment was to 
prevent Respondents from recovering their cost claim in case the 
dispute should be decided against Claimant”.7 
– Security for costs was denied in the context of a transfer of a party’s 
domicile from Switzerland to the Principality of Monaco. The 
arbitral tribunal held: “… Respondent has failed to produce prima 
facie evidence that Claimant’s transfer of his domicile to Monaco 
(allegedly more than ten years ago) stands in any direct or indirect 
connection with this arbitration, i.e. that Claimant deliberately 
moved to Monaco so as to escape enforcement of a possible future 
award in favor of Respondent” (Decision of 17 May 2003, p. 15 
below, at para. 27).  
– Security for costs was denied in the context of a company in 
bankruptcy. The arbitral tribunal considered: “… Respondent has 
failed to produce prima facie evidence that Claimant’s status as a 
company ‘in Bankruptcy’ stands in any direct or indirect 
connection with this arbitration, i.e. that Claimant deliberately 
manoeuvred itself into insolvency so as to deprive Respondent 
from recovering a possible future award in its favor. Furthermore, 
[…], there is no evidence before the Arbitral Tribunal that the 
bankruptcy proceedings against Claimant have ever been 
suspended due to lack of assets until today. Moreover, not even 
contended by Respondent are other circumstances amounting at 
bad faith as, e.g., deliberate divestiture from assets” (Decision of 
                                                     
7  In the German original: “… Grund zu der Vermutung, dass wenigstens einer dieser Beweggründe 
darin bestanden haben dürfte, die Beklagten für den Fall des Unterliegens der Klägerin an der 
Vollstreckung eines Parteikostenentscheids zu hindern” (Decision of 25 July 2003, p. 28 below, at 
para. 21). 
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17 June 2003, p. 23 below, at para. 29). It must be added that the 
bankrupt party’s estate still had liquid assets of more than CHF 
100 million (para. 2 of the Decision).  
In one decision, the arbitral tribunal denied security for costs on the 
grounds that the respondent asserted counterclaims involving the same facts 
and issues as the claimant’s claims and was intent on pursuing those 
counterclaims (Order of April 2009, p. 59 below, at para. 30).  
IV.  Further Practical Issues  
An order for security for costs is often requested at the very beginning of 
the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the question may arise as to whether the 
arbitral tribunal is authorized to decide upon such an application even though 
its jurisdiction is contested (normally by the respondent who also claims for the 
cautio judicatum solvi). It is widely recognized that an arbitral tribunal may 
award costs even if it ultimately determines that it has no jurisdiction over the 
dispute. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal in its Decision of 19 December 2008 
correctly stated “… that it accordingly is authorized to grant security for costs 
even if its jurisdiction to hear the merits of the instant dispute has been 
questioned by all respondents” (p. 47 below, at para. 5.2.11).  
Where an arbitral tribunal has concluded that the application for 
security for costs is justified, it has to decide in what form the party so 
ordered shall have to put up the cautio judicatum solvi. Possible solutions 
include a cash deposit with the arbitral tribunal or the provision of a security 
with similar “liquidity” as cash such as a bank guarantee or a stand-by letter 
of credit (Decision of 25 July 2003, p. 28 below, at para. 25 and Decision of 
4 July 2008, p. 37 below, at para. 34).  
Where security for costs has been ordered, the arbitral tribunal shall, in 
its final award, decide on the release of such security. If the party that had to 
put up the security (normally the claimant) is the successful party, the tribunal 
must usually simply order that the security be returned to that party. If the 
secured party (normally the respondent) is successful with its defence, the 
security must typically be released in favor of that party. In this context, the 
arbitral tribunal should make sure that the other party does not run the risk of 
having to pay twice the same amount; therefore, it should order that the 
security be set off against that party’s cost claim (to this effect see the 
dispositive part of the Final Award of 20 April 2009, p. 46 below).  
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V.  Security for Costs in Domestic Arbitration  
In Swiss domestic arbitration, Article 26 of the Concordat on 
Arbitration (CA) prevents an arbitral tribunal from ordering provisional and 
conservatory measures, basis for ordering security for costs. Hence an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal with its seat in Berne correctly decided on 9 February 2009 
that it was not authorized to hear a request for security for costs. Having been 
seized with an action for annulment on the grounds of Article 36 (b) CA, the 
Court of Appeals of the Canton of Bern, by judgment of 22 May 2009, 
confirmed the decision of the arbitral tribunal (see p. 77). The Court 
considered that the purpose of a cautio judicatum solvi can be compared with 
a seizure pursuant to Article 273 of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and 
Bankruptcy Code (SchKG/LP); therefore, the Court concluded, an order for 
security for costs is a provisional measure within the meaning of Article 26 
CA and, thus, is not within the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal acting under 
the Concordat (see Section III, para. 2-4).  
When the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) applicable to all 
Swiss cantons will take effect on 1 January 2011, domestic arbitral tribunals 
will also be empowered to order provisional and conservatory measures 
(Article 374 CCP). In addition, Article 379 CCP will provide a special 
statutory basis for ordering security for costs:  
Art. 379 Security for the Costs for Legal Representation and 
Assistance  
If the claimant appears to be insolvent, the arbitral tribunal may, 
upon request by the respondent, order the claimant to provide security 
for the respondent’s foreseeable costs for legal representation and 
assistance within a certain time. Article 378(2) applies mutatis 
mutandis to the respondent.  
The wording of this provision raises a number of questions. First, it 
seems inappropriate to limit the concept of security for costs to the costs for 
legal representation and assistance (dépens, Parteikosten). If the requirements 
for a cautio only materialize after the respondent has already paid its share of 
the deposit for the arbitrators’ fees and expenses, the respondent may have a 
legitimate interest to be protected also from the potential loss on those costs. 
Second, it would not seem correct to make the instrument of security for costs 
only available for the respondent (“… upon request by the respondent …”). 
Rather, one may conceive situations in which the claimant may also have an 
interest worthy of protection in obtaining security for costs from the 
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respondent.8 Third, Article 379 CCP seems to provide for an undue limitation 
of the concept of cautio judicatum solvi to instances where the claimant is 
insolvent (“… the claimant appears to be insolvent …”). As mentioned 
above, there is, besides the cases of manifest insolvency, a second category 
of situations in which security for costs may be appropriate: if a party 
deliberately takes measures that are specifically intended to frustrate the other 
party’s future cost claim (manoeuvres of bad faith).  
 
                                                     
8 For instance where the claimant is confronted with a counterclaim or if the respondent, in an obvious 
attempt of bad faith, is divesting its assets to make itself an empty shell; cf. Berger/Kellerhals, 
Internationale und interne Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz, Bern 2006, p. 516, footnote 42.  
Decision of 17 May 2003 in an International Ad hoc Arbitration 
with its seat in Berne between Mr X. (Claimant) and Mrs Y. 
(Respondent).  
I.  Background  
1. On April 3, 2003, Respondent filed a request for security for costs in 
the amount of CHF 600,000.-, together with a request for cancellation of the 
time limit of June 13, 2003, to file her Answer to the Statement of Claim (and 
her Counterclaim, if any), whereas a new 90 days time limit to that effect 
should be set as from the date on which such sureties have been put up.  
2. As to the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on her request, 
Respondent contends that the decision on an application for security for costs 
qualifies as a provisional or conservatory measure within the meaning of 
Article 183 SPIL. Respondent further refers to item 7.1 and 8.1 of the Terms 
of Reference of February 3, 2003, and also to Article 70(1) of the Berne Code 
of Civil Procedure (...).  
3. On the merits, Respondent substantially argues that Claimant resides 
“in a State known as a tax haven” (i.e., Monaco); that Claimant, with Article 
70(1) of the Berne Code of Civil Procedure in mind, has no domicile in 
Switzerland; that Claimant “is an astute businessman and might make 
arrangements to complicate recovery of the costs and expenses allocated by 
the arbitration tribunal”; that Monaco has signed the New York Convention, 
however, by making the declaration stipulated in Article 1(3) of said 
Convention; and that Monaco does not have the “reputation of facilitating the 
recovery of claims on the territory of this State and Mr X. did not choose that 
ARBITRATION PRACTICE – SECURITY FOR COSTS 
16 28 ASA BULLETIN 1/2010 (MARCH) 
domicile without being aware of all the advantages which he might gain as a 
result …” (...).  
4. On April 17, 2003, the Arbitral Tribunal determined by Procedural 
Order No. 2 the suspension of the time limit for Respondent to file her 
Answer to the Statement of Claim (and Counterclaim, if any), and invited 
Claimant to file comments on Respondent’s application for security for costs 
within three (3) weeks from the date of receipt of said order.  
5. On May 8, 2003, Claimant filed his comments on Respondent’s 
application for security for costs requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to dismiss 
Respondent’s application and to award Claimant costs related to this matter.  
6. Claimant, referring to more recent scholars, does not challenge the 
authority of the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on an application for security for costs.  
7. On the merits, Claimant, adding numerous references to doctrine 
and case law, concludes that, in international arbitration, security for costs 
can only be ordered in exceptional circumstances, and that, in the present 
case, such circumstances are not met. In particular, Claimant explains that he 
has his domicile in Monaco for about 10 years and, as a consequence thereof, 
there is no evidence provided by Respondent that Claimant chose this 
domicile to complicate recovery of a possible future cost award in favor of 
Respondent in this very arbitration.  
II.  The Arbitral Tribunal takes into Consideration  
A. Authority of the Arbitral Tribunal  
8. The Parties have agreed that this arbitration is an international 
arbitration governed by the procedural framework contained in Chapter 12 of 
the SPIL (cf. item 8.1.a of the Terms of Reference).  
9. Article 183(1) SPIL provides: “In the absence of an agreement by 
the parties to the contrary, the arbitral tribunal can, on application by a party, 
order precautionary or conservatory measures”. The Parties have expressly 
confirmed the applicability of Article 183 SPIL in item 7.2.c of the Terms of 
Reference. The Arbitral Tribunal therefore acknowledges that it has the 
power to order, on application by a Party, precautionary or conservatory 
measures in accordance with Article 183 SPIL.  
10. Thus, the next question to be determined is whether an order for 
security for costs qualifies as a precautionary or conservatory measure in the 
sense of Article 183 SPIL.  
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11. It is true that the authority of an arbitral tribunal to order security 
for costs has been generally doubted for some time, notably by Swiss 
authors1. It is worth noting, however, that the statements of these authors 
mainly dealt with domestic arbitration under the Swiss Concordat on 
Arbitration of March 27, 1969 (SR 271).  
12. In international arbitration, it is largely acknowledged today that the 
power to order security for costs is not reserved to state courts and proceedings 
before state authorities, but is rather also conferred to an arbitral tribunal:  
13. (a) Leading scholars consider that an order for security for costs 
forms one of the various categories of precautionary or conservatory 
measures2. Accordingly, these authors acknowledge that an arbitral tribunal 
sitting in Switzerland has, in accordance with Article 183 SPIL, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, the power to order a party to provide security 
for costs.  
14. (b) Furthermore, a considerable number of international arbitration 
awards made in Switzerland have determined that an arbitral tribunal has the 
power to require a party to provide security for costs. The most detailed 
recently reported decision was issued in a CCIG arbitration chaired by 
Professor Claude Reymond3. From a detailed review of authorities, the 
learned arbitrator formed the opinion that the power “to issue such an order 
in international arbitration located in Switzerland may be derived from 
Article 182(2) and 183 of the Act”. Another published case concerns an ICC 
arbitration4. A further decision was issued by a sole arbitrator in an ICC 
                                                     
1 See, in particular, Thomas Rüede/Reimer Hadenfeldt, Schweizerisches Schiedsgerichtsrecht nach 
IPRG und Konkordat, 2nd ed. Zurich 1993, p. 33 und p. 241; Pierre Lalive/Jean-François 
Poudret/Claude Reymond, Le droit de l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse, Lausanne 1989,  
p. 162; Pierre Jolidon, Commentaire du Concordat Suisse sur l’arbitrage, Berne 1984, p. 422; Max 
Guldener, Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht, 3rd ed., Zurich 1979, p. 611.  
2 Marc Blessing, in: Berti/Honsell/Vogt/Schnyder (eds.), International Arbitration in Switzerland, Basle 
2000, Intro, n. 843; Jean-François Poudret/Sébastien Besson, Droit comparé de l’arbitrage 
international, Zurich/Basle/Geneva 2002, n. 610 and n. 628. Pierre A. Karrer/Marcus Desax, Security 
for Costs in International Arbitration, why, when, and what if ..., in: Robert Briner et al. (eds.), Liber 
Amicorum Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Cologne 2001, p. 330 et seq.; Laurence Craig/William Park/Jan 
Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, 3rd ed., p. 467 §26.05; Yves Derains/Eric 
Schwartz, A guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration, The Hague 1998, p. 274; François Knoepfler, 
Les mesures provisoires et l’arbitrage international, in: Andreas Kellerhals (ed.), 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Zurich 1997, p. 307 et seq. 
3 Geneva Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIG), Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal of September 
25, 1997, A. S.p.A. (Italy) v. B. A.G. (Germany), security for costs denied; published in ASA Bulletin 
2001, p. 745 et seq. 
4 ICC Arbitration No. 8786, Interim Award (1996), Claimant and Counter-defendant (Turkey) v. 
Defendant and Counter-claimant (Germany), security for costs denied; published in ASA Bulletin 
2001, p. 751 et seq. (754). 
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arbitration who determined that “le Tribunal arbitral est d’avis que l’ordre 
de fournir des sûretés pour le paiement des dépens se rattache bel et bien à 
une mesure provisoire destiné à faciliter l’exécution future de la sentence à 
rendre”5. Earlier decisions stated that the authority of an arbitral tribunal to 
issue an order for security for costs should be recognized at least if the Parties 
have agreed on such competence in the arbitration clause, the arbitration 
agreement or in the terms of reference6.  
15. (c) Finally, reference is made to foreign arbitral decisions, which 
have likewise granted security for costs7. And it should be remembered that 
in England, one of the major centers for international arbitration, security for 
costs has been practiced for a long time. Only for the purpose of illustration, 
the Arbitral Tribunal refers the Parties to Article 38(3) of the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996, i.e., the English counterpart to Chapter 12 of the 
SPIL, which expressly states that the “tribunal may order a claimant to 
provide security for the costs of the arbitration”8.  
16. The Arbitral Tribunal considers the above authorities persuasive. It 
seems justified to rank an order for security for costs among the different 
categories of conservatory or precautionary measures. Duly considered, the 
purpose of such order is to ensure the future enforcement of a part of an 
arbitral tribunal’s final award, more precisely, the part dealing with the costs 
(incl. attorneys’ fees) of the arbitration9.  
17. As a result, by referring to Article 183 SPIL and to item 7.2.c of 
the Terms of Reference, the Arbitral Tribunal considers having the power to 
decide on Respondent’s request for security for costs.  
                                                     
5 Ordonnance de procédure n°1 du 21 décembre 1998, dans l’arbitrage entre X, Demanderesse et Y, 
Défenderesse et demanderesse reconventionelle, security for costs granted; published in ASA Bulletin 
1999, p. 59 et seq. (63). In the same way, the Final Award in the ICC Arbitration No. 7047 of 
February 28, 1994, did not deny security for costs on the ground that the arbitrators were of the 
opinion that they had no such power; published in ASA Bulletin 1995, p. 301 et seq. (305-306). 
6 Arbitrage entre X Panama, demanderesse, et une personne physique domiciliée à Genève, défendeur; 
published in ASA Bulletin 1995, p. 529 et seq. See also the Sixth Order in a Zurich Chamber of 
Commerce arbitration of November 12, 1991; reported in ASA Bulletin 1995, p. 84 et seq. 
7 See, e.g., decision in the ICC arbitration No 6697/1990, published in Revue de l’arbitrage 1992,  
p. 143 et seq. Decision in the ICC arbitration No 6682/1993, quoted in the decision reported in ASA 
Bulletin 2001, p. 745 (748). 
8 See also Article 25.2 of the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration of 1998 
(LCIA). 
9 „La question des dépens, supposé que l’arbitre en octroie à l’une ou l’autre partie, entre bien dans 
l’objet du litige et concerne effectivement la procédure ‚proprement dite’.“ See the decision reported 
in ASA Bulletin 1999, p. 59 (63). 
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B. Valid Reasons for Security for Costs in International Arbitration  
18. Once the Arbitral Tribunal has determined its general authority to 
decide on Respondent’s request, the question of what are the valid reasons 
for security for costs becomes relevant.  
19. Respondent substantially argues that Claimant is domiciled in 
Monaco and refers to Article 70(1) of the Berne Code of Civil Procedure. 
This provision states that a claimant, upon application of the respondent, may 
be ordered to provide security for the costs of the proceedings if the claimant 
is not domiciled in Switzerland, subject to international treaties or 
conventions.  
20. The Parties indeed agreed that the Arbitral Tribunal shall be guided 
“subsidiarily by the general principles laid down in the Berne Code of Civil 
Procedure” (cf. item 8.1.b of the Terms of Reference). This reference can be 
understood as a valid referral to a system of procedural law in the sense of 
Article 182(1) SPIL.  
21. The question of whether and to what extent the Berne Code of 
Civil Procedure shall apply to the present security proceedings is a matter 
of construction of the Parties’ agreement. Certainly, the mentioned 
reference cannot and does not mean that the Berne Code of Civil Procedure 
shall apply without taking due account of the fact that this is an 
international arbitration. In the present context, Respondent’s reference to 
the Berne Code of Civil Procedure is, however, not helpful. Article 70(1) is 
a provision designed for proceedings before state courts. It is common 
understanding in practice and doctrine of international arbitration that a 
decision on a request for security for costs may not depend on the criterion 
of the claimant’s domicile10. It seems obvious that both Claimant and 
Respondent would not have agreed to apply Article 70(1) of the Berne 
Code of Civil Procedure if they had been aware of such a consequence of 
their referral contained in item 8.1.b of the Terms of Reference. Put 
differently, it appears that Article 70(1) of the Berne Code of Civil 
Procedure does not belong to the “general principles” of said Code, to 
                                                     
10 See Poudret/Besson (op. cit.) n. 610 with further reference. See also the decision reported in ASA 
Bulletin 2001, p. 745 (749): „It is obvious that registration or domicile of the party outside the place 
of arbitration can not justify such an order, since such situation is in the essence of international 
arbitration.“ Similar consideration in the decision reported in ASA Bulletin 1999, p. 59 (64). Merely 
to emphasize this generally accepted principle, the Arbitral Tribunal refers again to the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996. Article 38(3)(a) of said Act states that the power to provide security for the 
costs of the arbitration “shall not be exercised on the ground that the claimant is … an individual 
ordinarily resident outside the United Kingdom”. 
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which the Parties referred in item 8.1.b of the Terms of Reference. As a 
consequence thereof, the application of this provision must be denied.  
22. The remaining reasons for security for costs provided in Article 70 
of the Berne Code of Civil Procedure are irrelevant in the case at hand. There 
is no evidence that Claimant might be insolvent or bankrupt, nor has 
Respondent in any way raised allegations to that effect; Article 70(2) to be 
denied. Moreover, Claimant’s main claim does not form an action under 
Article 83(2), 86(2) or 187 of the Swiss Bankruptcy Act (SR 281.1); Article 
70(3) to be denied.  
23. As a result, the Arbitral Tribunal has to decide whether the requested 
security for costs should or might be granted on grounds other than those 
mentioned in Article 70 of the Berne Code of Civil Procedure, in particular, on 
the basis of general principles developed in international arbitration.  
24. A review of the authorities quoted above shows that international 
arbitral tribunals as well as the leading scholars are generally reluctant to 
require a party to provide security for costs. Besides the already mentioned 
irrelevance of a party having its domicile outside the place of arbitration, they 
also tend to deny security for costs in case that a party is in financial 
difficulties, up to and including bankruptcy11. It seems justified that such 
risks are to be borne by the parties, given the nature of international 
arbitration, which normally arises out of operations of international trade, 
which generally imply greater risks than domestic trade. Similarly, the 
leading opinion considers the fact that a party’s state of domicile is not a 
signatory to the New York Convention12 is not a valid reason for security for 
costs13. Respondent, in this respect merely claiming that Monaco made the 
declarations provided for in Article I (3) of the NY-Convention, failed to 
produce prima facie evidence that an award on the subject of the present 
dispute might not be enforceable in Monaco due to the reservations contained 
therein (i.e., in Article I [3] of the NY-Convention).  
                                                     
11 See the decision reported in ASA Bulletin 2001, p. 745 (749). See also Poudret/Besson, op. cit., n. 
610. In another decision, sole arbitrator Markus Wirth held, however, that if a party went through 
bankruptcy proceedings that were suspended due to lack of assets, then the other party’s interest in 
security for costs should prevail over the first party’s interest in unimpeded access to arbitral justice; 
Zurich Chamber of Commerce (ZCC) Arbitration Proceedings No. 415, Claimant (Switzerland) v. 
Respondent (Netherlands), Fourth Order of November 20, 2001, published in ASA Bulletin 2002, 467 
(471); securties for costs granted. 
12 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention) of June 10, 1958 (SR 0.277.12). 
13 See, e.g., the decision reported in ASA Bulletin 1995, p. 301 (306). 
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25. Rather the general approach followed by the quoted authorities 
aims to limit security for costs in international arbitration to cases where a 
party has deliberately and in view of the arbitration taken steps so as to 
ensure that the other party, in case of a final award in its favor, would be 
deprived of recovering the costs of the arbitration. Professor Claude 
Reymond, in his reasoning, expressly refers to “manoeuvres contrary to good 
faith” and to “decisions made in circumstances amounting at bad faith”14.  
26. This rather restrictive approach seems justified, all the more so as it 
must be remembered that an order for security for costs qualifies as a 
category of precautionary or conservatory measures within the meaning of 
Article 183 SPIL. A precautionary or conservatory measure normally 
requires that a certain legal position of the applicant (a) is in acute danger, 
and that this very claim (b) is due15. The claim for recovery of costs, 
however, is never due at the time when a party requests that it be secured. For 
monetary claims, which are not yet due, precautionary or conservatory 
measures normally require that the debtor deliberately takes steps so as to 
escape from the performance of its obligations, or willfully divests itself from 
its assets16. This description precisely corresponds to the above-quoted 
“manoeuvres contrary to good faith”. It confirms that orders for security for 
costs should only be granted in exceptional circumstances.  
27. Returning to the present case, the Arbitral Tribunal determines that 
Respondent has failed to produce prima facie evidence that Claimant’s 
transfer of his domicile to Monaco (allegedly more than ten years ago) stands 
in any direct or indirect connection with this arbitration, i.e., that Claimant 
deliberately moved to Monaco so as to escape enforcement of a possible 
future award in favor of Respondent. Not even contended by Respondent are 
other circumstances amounting at bad faith as, e.g., deliberate divestiture 
from assets. Nor has Respondent produced prima facie evidence for her 
allegation that an award rendered in her favor would in fact not be 
enforceable in Monaco.  
28. In the light of the foregoing, the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that 
there is no ground for the issuance of an order for security for costs in this 
matter.  
                                                     
14 Cf. ASA Bulletin 2001, p. 745 (749 and 750). The learned arbitrator mentions, e.g., the divestiture of 
assets in order to launch the arbitration with or from an empty shell.  
15 Cf., e.g., Article 326(3) of the Berne Code of Civil Procedure as to non-monetary claims, and Article 
271(1) of the Swiss Bankruptcy Act for monetary claims. 
16 Cf., e.g., Article 271(2) in connection with Article 271(1) item 2 of the Swiss Bankruptcy Act. 
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C. Time Limit for Respondent’s Answer to the Statement of Claim  
29. As it follows from the above considerations, the Arbitral Tribunal 
rejects Respondent’s application for security for costs. Therefore, a new 
time limit for Respondent to file her Answer to the Statement of Claim (and 
her Counterclaim, if any) must be set from the date of receipt of this order 
by the Parties.  
[...]  
D. Costs of the Present Proceedings  
33. According to item 8.6.b of the Terms of Reference, the Arbitral 
Tribunal may decide upon the costs of the arbitration as and when it decides 
matters of substance or procedure. It is, however, not required to do so and 
may decide upon the costs in its final award only.  
34. The present decision of the Arbitral Tribunal as to the question of 
whether Claimant should be required to provide security for costs is a matter 
of procedure, which does not conclude these proceedings. Thus, it is 
appropriate to postpone the decision on the costs of these security 
proceedings (incl. attorneys’ fees) and to liquidate said costs together with 
the costs of the main proceedings.  
III.  The Arbitral Tribunal hereby Determines and Orders  
1. The Arbitral Tribunal dismisses Respondent’s request dated April 3, 
2003, for the provision of security for costs of the arbitration.  
2. In accordance with its considerations in para. 29 et seq. hereof, the 
Arbitral Tribunal hereby invites Respondent to file her Answer to the 
Statement of Claim (and her Counterclaim, if any) within 30 days upon 
receipt of this [Decision].  
3. In accordance with item 8.6.b of the Terms of Reference, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall decide on the costs of this [Decision] in its Final Award. 
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Procedural Order No. 4 of 17 June 2003 in an International Ad 
hoc Arbitration with its seat in Geneva between X. Holding in 
Bankruptcy, Switzerland (Claimant), and Y. Co. Ltd., Republic of 
Yemen (Respondent).  
I.  Background  
1. By letters dated October 20, 2002, and November 19, 2002, 
Respondent inter alia sought an order from the Arbitral Tribunal that 
Claimant pay a security for legal costs of Respondent in the amount of at 
least CHF 2,206,000.- (computed on the basis of the ordinance on lawyer’s 
fees of the Appeal Court of Zurich of June 10, 1987). Respondent essentially 
based its request for security for costs on the fact that Claimant is a company 
“in Bankruptcy”.  
2. By letters dated October 23, 2002, and December 23, 2002, 
Claimant asked for rejection of Respondent’s request, on the one hand by 
contesting the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make provisional orders in 
this arbitration, on the other hand by referring to the fact that the estate of 
Claimant still has liquid assets in excess of CHF 110 million, which will 
result in a dividend to its creditors of between 5% and 10%. Claimant, 
however, indicated its readiness to provide a bank guarantee in a reasonable 
amount as security for the legal costs of Respondent, provided that 
Respondent would be required to do so, too.  
3. In Section 6.7(a) of Procedural Order No. 1 of April 2, 2003, the 
Arbitral Tribunal invited both Parties to inform it within 20 days whether or 
not they accept a proposal as to which each Party provides a bank guarantee 
in the amount of CHF 500,000.- as security for costs of the adverse Party. In 
the event that one or both Parties should refuse to accept the mutual security, 
Section 6.7(b) of Procedural Order No. 1 provided that the Arbitral Tribunal 
shall notify such disagreement and decide on Respondent’s request for 
security for costs by separate order, if need be after another exchange of 
written submissions on this subject.  
4. By letter of May 9, 2003, Claimant indicated its readiness to provide 
the proposed bank guarantee as security for costs in favor of Respondent. By 
letter of May 13, 2003, Respondent informed the Arbitral Tribunal that it is 
neither able to pay its share of the advance on costs of the arbitration, nor in a 
position to provide the proposed bank guarantee as security for costs in favor 
of Claimant.  
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5. In the meantime, Claimant has timely paid its own share of the 
advance on costs of the arbitration in the amount of CHF 150,000.- (...). In 
addition, as a result of Respondent’s failure to pay its share of the advance on 
costs, Claimant has advanced, as provided for in Section 6.3(a)(3) of 
Procedural Order No 1, another CHF 150,000.- on account of advance on 
costs of the arbitration (...).  
6. It results from para. 4 hereof that the Parties did not agree on the 
mutual security for costs proposed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Hence, the 
Arbitral Tribunal is now called to proceed as provided in Section 6.7(b) of 
Procedural Order No. 1, i.e., to decide on Respondent’s request for security 
for costs of October 20, 2002, and November 19, 2002, respectively.  
7. In view of the pertinent doctrine and case law regarding the issue of 
security for costs in international commercial arbitration, which will be 
discussed in detail in Sections II.A. and II.B. infra, the Arbitral Tribunal 
considers the present case ready to be decided. Therefore, the Arbitral 
Tribunal has concluded – as was reserved in Section 6.7(b) of Procedural 
Order No 1 – to decide on Respondent’s request for security for costs without 
previously ordering another exchange of written submissions on this subject.  
II.  The Arbitral Tribunal takes into Consideration 
A. Authority of the Arbitral Tribunal 
1. Authority to Order Conservatory or Precautionary Measures  
8. The Arbitral Tribunal has determined that this arbitration is an 
international arbitration governed by the procedural framework contained in 
Chapter 12 of the SPIL; cf. Section 6.1(a) of Procedural Order No. 1.  
9. Moreover, the Arbitral Tribunal, taking account of item 6 of the 
Memorandum of Agreement of September 13, 1991, concluded that it shall 
further apply the Concordat Suisse sur l’Arbitrage (CSA); cf. Section 6.1(b) 
of Procedural Order No. 1.  
10. Article 183(1) SPIL provides that an arbitral tribunal can, in the 
absence of an agreement by the parties to the contrary, on application by a 
party, order precautionary or conservatory measures. Article 26 CSA, on the 
other hand, provides that the authority to order precautionary or conservatory 
measures remains solely with the ordinary state courts.  
11. In the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, the above is not a conflict 
of norms in the common sense. In the present case, the purpose of the 
Parties’ reference to the CSA (cf. item 6 of the Memorandum of Agreement 
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of September 13, 1991) is not to exclude the provisions of the SPIL but 
rather to apply the CSA in addition, i.e., in complement to the provisions of 
the SPIL.  
12. As a result, failing an agreement between the Parties to the 
contrary, the Arbitral Tribunal acknowledges that it has the power to order, 
on application by a Party, precautionary or conservatory measures in 
accordance with Article 183 SPIL.  
2. Qualification of an Order for Security for Costs 
13. […]. 
[Essentially same reasoning as in para. 11-17 of the Decision of 17 
May 2003.] 
3. Conclusion 
20. By referring to Article 183 SPIL and to Section 6.1(a) of 
Procedural Order No. 1, the Arbitral Tribunal considers having the power to 
decide on Respondent’s request for security for costs. 
B. Valid Reasons for Security for Costs in International Arbitration 
21. Once the Arbitral Tribunal has determined its general authority to 
decide on Respondent’s request, the question of what are the valid reasons 
for security for costs becomes relevant.  
22. As already mentioned, Respondent substantially applies for 
security for costs on the ground that Claimant is a company “in Bankruptcy”.  
23. A review of the authorities quoted above shows that international 
arbitral tribunals as well as the leading scholars are generally reluctant to 
require a party to provide security for costs:  
24. (a) It is common understanding in international arbitration that a 
decision on a request for security for costs may, e.g., not depend on the 
criterion of the claimant’s domicile1.  
                                                     
1 See Poudret/Besson (op. cit.) n. 610 with further reference. See also the decision reported in ASA 
Bulletin 2001, p. 745 (749): „It is obvious that registration or domicile of the party outside the place 
of arbitration can not justify such an order, since such situation is in the essence of international 
arbitration.“ Similar consideration in the decision reported in ASA Bulletin 1999, p. 59 (64). Merely 
to emphasize this generally accepted principle, the Arbitral Tribunal refers again to the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996. Article 38(3)(a) of said Act states that the power to provide security for the 
costs of the arbitration “shall not be exercised on the ground that the claimant is … an individual 
ordinarily resident outside the United Kingdom”. 
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25. (b) Doctrine and case law also tend to deny security for costs in 
case that a party is in financial difficulties, up to and including bankruptcy2. It 
seems justified that such risks are to be borne by the parties, given the nature 
of international arbitration, which normally arises out of operations of 
international trade, which generally imply greater risks than domestic trade. 
After all, sole arbitrator Markus Wirth recently held that if a party went 
through bankruptcy proceedings, which were suspended due to lack of assets, 
then the other party’s interest in security for costs should prevail over the first 
party’s interest in unimpeded access to arbitral justice3. The case at hand, 
however, differs from the aforementioned one in so far as there is no 
evidence that the bankruptcy proceedings against Claimant have ever been 
suspended due to lack of assets until today.  
26. (c) Likewise, the leading opinion considers the fact that a party’s 
state of domicile is not a signatory to the New York Convention4 is not a 
valid reason for security for costs5.  
27. In general, the approach followed by the quoted authorities rather 
aims to limit security for costs in international arbitration to cases where a 
party has deliberately and in view of the arbitration taken steps so as to 
ensure that the other party, in case of a final award in its favor, would be 
deprived of recovering the costs of the arbitration. Professor Claude 
Reymond, in his reasoning, expressly refers to “manoeuvres contrary to good 
faith” and to “decisions made in circumstances amounting at bad faith”6.  
28. This rather restrictive approach seems justifiable, all the more so as 
it must be remembered that an order for security for costs qualifies as a 
category of precautionary or conservatory measures within the meaning of 
Article 183 SPIL. A precautionary or conservatory measure normally 
requires that a certain legal position of the applicant (a) is in acute danger, 
and that this very claim (b) is due7. The claim for recovery of costs, however, 
is never due at the time when a party requests that it be secured. For 
                                                     
2 See the decision reported in ASA Bulletin 2001, p. 745 (749). See also Poudret/Besson, op. cit., n. 
610. 
3 Zurich Chamber of Commerce (ZCC) Arbitration Proceedings No. 415, Claimant (Switzerland) v. 
Respondent (Netherlands), Fourth Order of November 20, 2001, published in ASA Bulletin 2002, 467 
(471); securities for costs granted. 
4 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention) of June 10, 1958 (SR 0.277.12). 
5 See, e.g., the decision reported in ASA Bulletin 1995, p. 301 (306). 
6 Cf. ASA Bulletin 2001, p. 745 (749 and 750). The learned arbitrator mentions, e.g., the divestiture of 
assets in order to launch the arbitration with or from an empty shell.  
7 Cf., e.g., Article 326(3) of the Berne Code of Civil Procedure as to non-monetary claims, and Article 
271(1) of the Swiss Bankruptcy Act for monetary claims. 
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monetary claims, which are not yet due, precautionary or conservatory 
measures normally require that the debtor deliberately takes steps so as to 
escape from the performance of its obligations, or willfully divests itself from 
its assets8. This description precisely corresponds to the above-quoted 
“manoeuvres contrary to good faith”. It confirms that orders for security for 
costs should only be granted in exceptional circumstances.  
29. Returning to the present case, the Arbitral Tribunal determines that 
Respondent has failed to produce prima facie evidence that Claimant’s status 
as a company “in Bankruptcy” stands in any direct or indirect connection 
with this arbitration, i.e., that Claimant deliberately manoeuvred itself into 
insolvency so as to deprive Respondent from recovering a possible future 
award in its favor. Furthermore, as already mentioned, there is no evidence 
before the Arbitral Tribunal that the bankruptcy proceedings against 
Claimant have ever been suspended due to lack of assets until today. 
Moreover, not even contended by Respondent are other circumstances 
amounting at bad faith as, e.g., deliberate divestiture from assets.  
30. Needless to add that Claimant seems far from being an illiquid 
company: as opposed to Respondent, Claimant was not only ready to provide 
a bank-guarantee in the amount of CHF 500,000.- as a security for 
Respondent’s costs, but rather also fully advanced both its own and 
Respondent’s share of the ordered advance on costs of the arbitration (cf. 
para. 5 hereof).  
31. In the light of the foregoing, the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that 
there is no ground for the issuance of an order for security for costs in this 
matter. 
III.  The Arbitral Tribunal hereby Determines and Orders  
1. In accordance with Section 6.7(b) of Procedural Order No. 1 of April 
2, 2003, the Arbitral Tribunal determines that the Parties did not agree 
on the mutual security for costs proposed by the Arbitral Tribunal 
under Section 6.7(a) of Procedural Order No. 1 (mutual bank guarantee 
in the amount of CHF 500,000.-).  
2. The Arbitral Tribunal dismisses Respondent’s request for the provision 
of security for costs of the arbitration dated October 20, 2003, and 
November 19, 2002, respectively.  
                                                     
8 Cf., e.g., Article 271(2) in connection with Article 271(1) item 2 of the Swiss Bankruptcy Act. 
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3. In accordance with Section 6.8(c) of Procedural Order No 1 of April 2, 
2003, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide on the costs of this Procedural 
Order No. 4 in its Final Award.  
  
Verfügung Nr. 6 vom 25. Juli 2003 des Schiedsgerichts der 
Handels-, Industrie- und Gewerbekammer des Kantons Tessin 
(Ccia-Ti Nr. 103/00) in der Streitsache zwischen X. SA, Panama 
(Klägerin) und A., B., C. a.s. sowie D. a.s., alle Tschechische 
Republik (Beklagte). Schiedsrichter: Werner Wenger, Franz 
Kellerhals und Wolfgang Peter.  
I.  Grundlagen  
1. In ihrer Stellungnahme vom 14. Januar 2002 verlangte die Beklagte 
Nr. 4 von der Klägerin eine Kostensicherstellung (cautio judicatum solvi) als 
Garantie ihrer eigenen Kosten im Zusammenhang mit dem vorliegenden 
Streitfall, da die Klägerin eine unbekannte panamaische Gesellschaft sei.  
2. In ihrer Stellungnahme vom 28. Juni 2002 verlangte die Beklagte 
Nr. 3 von der Klägerin eine Kostensicherstellung (cautio judicatum solvi) als 
Garantie ihrer eigenen Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der vorliegenden 
Streitigkeit. Sie beantragt, das Schiedsverfahren bis zur erfolgten Leistung 
der Sicherheit einzustellen.  
3. Das Schiedsgericht hat am 17. Oktober 2002 den Beklagten eine 
Frist bis zum 18. Februar 2003 zur Einreichung der auf die Fragen der 
Zuständigkeit und der Kostensicherstellung beschränkten Klageantworten im 
Sinne von Artikel 10.3 des Schiedsreglements von Lugano (nachfolgend „das 
Schiedsreglement“) gesetzt.  
4. Auf Antrag der Beklagten Nr. 1, 2 und 4 hat das Schiedsgericht am 
26. Dezember 2002 diese Frist für alle vier Beklagten bis zum 31. März 2003 
erstreckt (Verfügung Nr. 3).  
5. Am 31. März 2003 haben alle vier Beklagten ihre auf die Fragen der 
Zuständigkeit und der Kostensicherstellung beschränkte Klageantwort beim 
Schiedsgericht eingereicht. Am 31. Mai 2003 haben die Beklagten eine weitere 
Schrift über den Betrag einer eventuellen Kostensicherstellung eingereicht.  
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6. In ihren Klageantworten vom 31. März 2003 und weiteren Eingaben 
vom 31. Mai 2003 beantragen die Beklagten Nr. 1 und 2 eine 
Kostensicherstellung (cautio iudicatum solvi) in Höhe von CHF 100'000.- 
von der Klägerin als Garantie ihrer eigenen Kosten im Zusammenhang mit 
dem vorliegenden Streitfall, da die Klägerin eine Gesellschaft mit Sitz in 
Panama ist, über deren finanziellen Verhältnisse nichts bekannt sei. Die 
Beklagten Nr. 1 und 2. führen an, dass die Verfügung einer 
Kostensicherstellung notwendig sei, um ihre berechtigten Ansprüche auf 
Prozessentschädigung sicherzustellen. Insbesondere behaupten die Beklagten 
Nr. 1 und 2, dass Y. der wahre Ansprecher der eingeklagten Forderung sei 
und dieser die Klägerin als Prozesspartei nur vorschiebe, um in der 
Öffentlichkeit nicht als Partei wahrgenommen zu werden sowie um sich im 
Fall des Unterliegens der Vollstreckung zu entziehen; die Vollstreckung in 
Panama sei, obwohl auch dieser Staat das NY-Übereinkommen unterzeichnet 
hat, unsicher und mit erheblichem zusätzlichem Aufwand verbunden. Die 
Tatsache, dass die Klägerin alle vorherigen Kosten bezahlt habe, ändere 
daran nichts. Im übrigen verweisen die Beklagten Nr. 1 und 2 auf die 
Eingaben der Beklagten Nr. 4 vom 14. Januar 2002 und der Beklagten Nr. 3 
vom 28. Juni 2002.  
6. In ihrer Klageantwort vom 31. März 2003 und weiteren Eingaben 
vom 31. Mai 2003 fordert die Beklagte Nr. 3 eine Kostensicherstellung von 
CHF 200'000.- von der Klägerin. Die Beklagte Nr. 3 führt an, dass die 
Klägerin eine panamaische Gesellschaft ist, über deren Aktivitäten und 
Vermögenslage nichts bekannt sei. Es sei anzunehmen, dass die Klägerin die 
ihr in einem Schiedsspruch anfallenden Kosten und Entschädigung nicht 
bezahlen könne. Eine Kostensicherstellung sollte deshalb den Eintritt eines 
für die Beklagte Nr. 3 nicht leicht wiedergutzumachenden Nachteils 
abwenden und damit die Zahlung ihrer Verfahrenskosten und die 
Vollstreckung eines Schiedsspruchs in Panama gewähren. Die Beklagte Nr. 3 
macht weiter geltend, dass sie nie an der im Aktionärbindungsvertrag 
enthaltenen Schiedsvereinbarung beteiligt war und dass die Klägerin nur eine 
Zessionarin von Rechten sei, die aus dem Aktionärbindungsvertrag 
erwachsen sein sollen.  
7. In ihrer Klageantwort vom 31. März 2003 und weiteren Eingaben 
vom 31. Mai 2003 fordert die Beklagte Nr. 4 eine Kostensicherstellung von 
CHF 250'000.- von der Klägerin. Die Beklagte Nr. 4 beantragt, dass die 
Klägerin noch vor jeglichen anderen Verfahrensschritten zur Leistung einer 
Kostensicherstellung verpflichtet werde. Eine solche Kostensicherstellung 
solle die Risiken einer Nichtzahlung ihrer Kosten im Zusammenhang mit 
dem Schiedsverfahren von der Klägerin sowie die Risiken der Vollstreckung 
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eines Schiedsspruchs in Panama vermeiden. Die Beklagte Nr. 4 führt weiter 
an, dass die Klägerin eine panamaische Gesellschaft ist, von deren 
Aktivitäten und Vermögenslage nichts bekannt sei, insbesondere sei sie 
vielleicht nur eine „empty-shell“-Gesellschaft. Die Beklagte Nr. 4 führt 
weiter an, dass die Klägerin nur eine Zessionarin von Rechten sei, die aus 
dem Aktionärsbindevertrag erwachsen sein sollen, und dass das 
Schiedsverfahren eigentlich von Y. finanziert wird. Die Beklagte Nr. 4 
behauptet weiter, dass sie nie Partei des Aktionärbindungsvertrags war. 
8. In ihrer Klageschrift vom 18. Dezember 2003 und Erwiderungsschrift 
vom 2. Mai 2003 beantragt die Klägerin, den Antrag der Beklagten auf 
Kostensicherstellung abzuweisen, da die Gründe für eine Kostensicherstellung 
nicht gegeben seien. Insbesondere führt die Klägerin an, dass eine 
Kostensicherstellung nicht ausdrücklich in der Schiedsvereinbarung vorgesehen 
sei, dass ihre finanzielle Lage gut sei, dass ihr ausländischer Sitz in einem 
internationalen Schiedsverfahren nicht beachtet werden sollte und dass kein 
besonderes Problem für eine Vollstreckung vorläge. Die Klägerin behauptet 
weiter, dass die Abtretung der Ansprüche von Y. an sie irrelevant sei, da dieser 
kein Aktionär der Klägerin wäre. Die Klägerin macht weiter geltend, dass eine 
Kostensicherstellung die Regel der Gleichbehandlung der Parteien verletzte.  
II.  Die Kostensicherstellung in einem Schiedsverfahren 
2.1 Vorsorgliche Massnahmen 
9. Art. 34 des Schiedsreglements regelt die vorsorglichen Massnahmen 
und lautet:  
„Im Bereich der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit ist Artikel 183 IPRG 
anwendbar.“  
10. Das Schiedsgericht hat entschieden, dass das vorliegende 
Schiedsverfahren ein internationales Schiedsverfahren im Sinne des Art. 176 
IPRG ist und dass daher die Art. 176 ff. IPRG Anwendung finden (...).  
11. Art. 183 Abs. 1 IPRG sieht vor, dass, wenn die Parteien nichts 
anderes vereinbart haben, das Schiedsgericht auf Antrag einer Partei 
vorsorgliche oder sichernde Massnahmen anordnen kann. 
12. Gemäss diesen Bestimmungen ist das Schiedsgericht im 
Allgemeinen ermächtigt, vorsorgliche Massnahmen anzuordnen. 
2.2 Qualifikation der Kostensicherstellung 
13. Da das Schiedsgericht ermächtigt ist, vorsorgliche Massnahmen 
anzuordnen, stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Kostensicherstellung als 
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vorsorgliche Massnahme im Sinne des Art. 183 Abs. 1 IPRG in Betracht 
gezogen werden kann.  
14. Nach herrschender Lehre gilt in der internationalen 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit der Grundsatz, dass ein Schiedsgericht ermächtigt ist, 
Kostensicherstellungen anzuordnen, da solche Anordnungen als vorsorgliche 
Massnahmen qualifizieren1. Ein Schiedsgericht mit Sitz in der Schweiz ist 
mithin gestützt auf Art. 183 Abs. 1 IPRG ermächtigt, Kostensicherstellungen 
zu verfügen, wenn die Parteien nichts anders vereinbart haben.  
15. Im weiteren kann auf eine inzwischen erhebliche Anzahl von 
Präjudizien verwiesen werden, worin sich internationale Schiedsgerichte mit 
Sitz in der Schweiz für den Erlass von Kostensicherstellungsverfügungen 
(gestützt auf Art. 183 IPRG) für zuständig erklärt haben2.  
16. Die Zuständigkeit des Schiedsgerichts für die Anordnung von 
Kostensicherstellungen entspricht auch der Praxis auf ausländischen 
Schiedsplätzen. Namentlich in England, einem der wichtigsten Zentren der 
internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, ist die Befugnis des Schiedsgerichts 
zum Erlass von Kostensicherstellungsverfügungen heute sogar gesetzlich 
festgeschrieben3.  
17. Gemäss allen diesen Erwägungen entscheidet das Schiedsgericht, 
dass eine Kostensicherstellung eine der verschiedenen vorsorglichen 
Massnahmen ist, deren Zweck die Gewährung der zukünftigen Vollstreckung 
eines Teils des Schiedsspruchs und insbesondere des Teils über die Kosten 
(inkl. Anwaltskosten) des Schiedsverfahrens ist. 
2.3 Befugnis des Schiedsgerichts 
18. Das Schiedsgericht bestimmt, dass es gemäss Art. 34 des 
Schiedsreglements und Art. 183 Abs. 1 IPRG ermächtigt ist, die Leistung 
einer Kostensicherstellung durch die Klägerin anzuordnen. 
                                                     
1 Marc BLESSING in BERTI/HONSELL/VOGT/SCHNYDER, International Arbitration in 
Switzerland, Basel 2000, Intro, N. 843; Jean-François POUDRET/Sébastien BESSON, Droit comparé 
de l'arbitrage international, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2002, N. 610 and N. 628; Pierre A. KARRER/Marcus 
DESAX, Security for costs in International Arbitration, why, when, and what if…, in: Robert 
BRINER et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Cologne 2001, p. 330 ff.; Laurence 
CRAIG/William PARK/Jan PAULSSON, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, Den Haag 
1998, S. 274; François KNOEPFLER, Les measures provisoires et l'arbitrage international, in Andreas 
KELLERHALS, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Zurich 1997, S. 307 ff. 
2 ASA Bulletin 2002, 467 (471); ASA Bulletin 2001, S. 745; ASA Bulletin 2001, S. 751 (754); ASA 
Bulletin 1999, 59 (63); ASA Bulletin 1995, 301 (305-306). 
3 Art. 38 (3) des English Arbitration Act of 1996; siehe auch Art. 25.2 der Arbitration Rules of the 
London Court of International Arbitration of 1998 (LCIA). 
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III.  Gründe der Anordnung auf Kostensicherstellung  
19. Wie schon oben erwähnt, begründen die Beklagten ihren Antrag 
auf Kostensicherstellung hauptsächlich mit der Tatsache, dass die Klägerin 
eine panamaische Gesellschaft ist, von deren Aktivitäten und Vermögenslage 
nichts bekannt sei, insbesondere, dass sie vermutlich nur eine „empty-shell“-
Gesellschaft sei. Die Beklagten machen auch geltend, dass die Klägerin nur 
eine Zessionarin von Rechten sei, die aus dem Aktionärbindungsvertrag 
erwachsen sein sollen, und dass das Schiedsverfahren eigentlich von Y. 
finanziert werde. Schliesslich behaupten die Beklagten, dass sie an keiner 
relevanten und schriftlichen Schiedsvereinbarung beteiligt seien. 
20. Theorie und Praxis sind sich einig, dass in der internationalen 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit hinsichtlich der Anordnung von 
Kostensicherstellungen Zurückhaltung geboten ist. Die Anordnung einer 
Kostensicherstellung stellt eine einschneidende Massnahme zulasten einer 
Prozesspartei dar. Sie kann u.U. dazu führen, dass der damit belasteten Partei 
(mangels Liquidität) der Anspruch auf Beurteilung des eingeklagten Rechts 
durch das (vertraglich vereinbarte) Schiedsgericht entzogen wird. 
Kostensicherstellungsverfügungen sind deshalb auf begründete 
Ausnahmefälle zu beschränken. 
Für die Anordnung einer cautio iudicatum solvi reicht es z.B. nicht aus, 
dass eine Partei im Ausland domiziliert ist4. Ebenso wenig genügt es, dass der 
Staat, in welchem die Partei domiziliert ist, das NY-Übereinkommen5 nicht 
unterzeichnet hat6. Auch genügt z.B. der Umstand, dass eine Partei in 
finanziellen Schwierigkeiten steckt oder gar zahlungsunfähig ist, für sich allein 
noch nicht zur Anordnung einer Kostensicherstellung7; erst wenn bspw. der 
Konkurs mangels Aktiven eingestellt wurde, dürfte sich die Anordnung einer 
cautio iudicatum solvi aufdrängen8.  
Nach herrschender Lehre und Rechtsprechung hat die gesuchstellende 
Partei (hier die Beklagten) dem Schiedsgericht Tatsachen und Indizien 
                                                     
4 Siehe Jean-François POUDRET/Sébastien BESSON, op. cit. , N. 610. IHK Entscheid im ASA Bull. 
1999, S. 59 ff., insb. S. 64: "l'une des spécificités de l'arbitrage international, qui est sa délocalisation, 
conduit à ne pas prendre en considération le domicile ou l'établissement de l'une des parties"; 
ähnliches im GIHK Entscheid des Schiedsgerichts vom 25. September 1997, in ASA Bull. 2001,  
S. 745 ff., insb. 749. 
5 Übereinkommen über die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer Schiedssprüche vom 10. 
Juni 1958 (New Yorker Übereinkommen). 
6 Siehe z.B. Entscheid in ASA Bull. 1995, p. 301, insb. 306 
7 Vgl. etwa ASA Bulletin 2001, 745 (749) sowie POUDRET/BESSON, op. cit., Rn. 610. 
8 So der Entscheid in Bulletin 2002, 467 (471). 
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vorzutragen, welche prima facie9 darauf schliessen lassen, dass die 
Gesuchsgegnerin (hier die Klägerin) im Hinblick auf ihr Unterliegen im 
Schiedsprozess Massnahmen getroffen hat, die darauf abzielen, die 
gesuchstellende Partei an der künftigen Einforderung einer zugesprochenen 
Parteikostenentschädigung zu hindern bzw. die Vollstreckung dieses 
Anspruchs zu vereiteln. Es müssen m.a.W. Anzeichen namhaft gemacht 
werden, die glaubhaft erscheinen lassen, dass ein Partei bewusst mit Blick 
auf das Schiedsverfahren Massnahmen getroffen hat, welche sicherstellen 
sollen, dass die Gegenseite für den Fall ihres Obsiegens an der 
Rückgewinnung ihrer Verfahrenskosten gehindert sein würde. Eine solche 
Annahme kann z.B. gerechtfertigt sein, wenn die anspruchsberechtigte Partei 
den Klageanspruch im Hinblick auf den Schiedsprozess an eine „empty-
shell“-Gesellschaft zediert, welche alsdann als Klägerin auftritt10; oder wenn 
eine Partei im Hinblick auf oder während des laufenden Schiedsverfahrens 
ihren Sitz in einen Staat verlegt, in welchem die Vollstreckung von 
Schiedssprüchen anerkanntermassen erheblich erschwert ist. 
Zusammengefasst hält das Schiedsgericht fest, dass die Anordnung 
einer Kostensicherstellung auf Machenschaften einer Partei zu beschränken 
ist, die ein Verhalten wider Treu und Glauben erkennen lassen11. 
21. Im vorliegenden Fall sprechen die folgenden Umstände für die 
Anordnung einer Kostensicherstellung: 
– Die Klägerin beruft sich hinsichtlich ihrer Aktivlegitimation auf 
einen Abtretungsvertrag vom 5. Dezember 2000 (KB 1). Aus 
diesem Dokument ist ersichtlich, dass Y. seine angeblichen 
Schadenersatzansprüche aus einem Aktienkaufvertrag, den er mit 
den Beklagten abgeschlossen haben will, an die Klägerin abgetreten 
hat. Die Klägerin hat bis heute weder einen tatsächlichen noch 
einen rechtlichen Grund für die fragliche Forderungszession 
vorgebracht. Dies obwohl sie, nach entsprechender Aufforderung 
durch die Beklagten und das Schiedsgericht, dazu mehrmals 
Gelegenheit gehabt hat. Das Schiedsgericht stellt fest, dass aus dem 
bisherigen Schriftenwechsel nicht hervorgeht, welche Motive die 
Klägerin zum besagten Forderungserwerb bewogen haben.  
                                                     
9 Vgl. François KNOEPFLER, Les décisions redues par l'arbitre à la suite d'un examen 'prima facie', 
ASA Bulletin 2002, 587 (599). 
10 Siehe z.B. GIHK Entscheid des Schiedsgerichts vom 25. September 1997, in ASA Bull. 2001, S. 745 
ff., insb. 749-750; den KEN REN Fall; Philippe FOUCHARD/Emmanuel GAILLARD/Berthold 
GOLDMANN, Traité de l'arbitrage commercial international, Paris 1999, p. 703. 
11 Vgl. den Entscheid in ASA Bulletin 2001, 745 (749 und 750) worin ausdrücklich "manoeuvres 
contrary to good faith" und "decision made in circumstances amounting at bad faith" verlangt werden. 
ARBITRATION PRACTICE – SECURITY FOR COSTS 
34 28 ASA BULLETIN 1/2010 (MARCH) 
Ebenso stellt das Schiedsgericht fest, dass die Klägerin bisher jede 
Angabe über einen Rechtsgrund für die fragliche Zession schuldig 
geblieben ist, sich insbes. darüber ausgeschwiegen hat, ob und inwieweit 
sie für den Forderungserwerb eine Gegenleistung erbracht hat oder noch 
erbringen wird.  
– Der genannte Abtretungsvertrag (KB 1) zwischen Y. und der 
Klägerin wurde am 5. Dezember 2000 unterzeichnet. Lediglich 15 
Tage später, d.h. am 20. Dezember 2000, hat die Klägerin bei der 
im Aktionärsbindungsvertrag vom 21. August 1998 (KB 2) 
vorgesehenen Schiedsstelle gegen die Beklagten 1–4 das 
vorliegende Schiedsverfahren eingeleitet. Das Schiedsgericht stellt 
fest, dass sich die Klägerin zu dieser (zeitlichen) Koinzidenz in 
ihren verschiedenen Eingaben nicht geäussert hat. Der Umstand, 
dass die Abtretung des Klageanspruchs und die Einleitung des 
vorliegenden Verfahrens praktisch zusammenfallen, erhärtet für das 
Schiedsgericht den Verdacht, dass die Zession vom 5. Dezember 
2000 (KB 1) bewusst im Hinblick auf das unmittelbar 
bevorstehende Schiedsverfahren erfolgt ist.  
– Über die wahren Gründe, die Y. bzw. die Klägerin bewogen haben 
mögen, im Hinblick auf das vorliegende Schiedsverfahren die 
behaupteten Ansprüche aus dem angeblichen Aktienkaufvertrag mit 
den Beklagten abzutreten bzw. zu erwerben, ist dem Schiedsgericht 
(ausser den von den Beklagten angestellten Mutmassungen) nichts 
bekannt. Aufgrund der bisherigen Erwägungen hat das 
Schiedsgericht hingegen Grund zu der Vermutung, dass wenigstens 
einer dieser Beweggründe darin bestanden haben dürfte, die 
Beklagten für den Fall des Unterliegens der Klägerin an der 
Vollstreckung eines Parteikostenentscheids zu hindern. Dafür 
spricht einmal die Tatsache, dass Y. in der Person der Klägerin mit 
einer Gesellschaft kontrahiert hat, über deren Aktivitäten und 
Vermögenslage dem Schiedsgericht keine Angaben vorliegen, die 
den Verdacht ausschliessen würden, dass es sich dabei lediglich um 
ein Vehikel handelt, dessen einziges Aktivum der vorliegende 
Klageanspruch ist und dessen einziger Zweck (momentan) darin 
besteht, in der Klägerrolle den vorliegenden Schiedsprozess zu 
führen. Anderseits spricht für die erwähnte Vermutung der 
Umstand, dass Y. als Zessionarin eine Gesellschaft in Panama 
ausgesucht hat. Wiewohl (auch) Panama ein Signatarstaat des NY-
Übereinkommens ist, erachtet es das Schiedsgericht als notorisch, 
dass es für die Beklagte ungleich schwieriger und mit erheblich 
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grösserem Aufwand verbunden sein dürfte, einen allfälligen 
Anspruch auf Parteikostenentschädigung statt z.B. in Tschechien 
(Wohnsitzstaat des Zedenten Y.) in Panama durchsetzen zu müssen.  
– Die Klägerin hat ferner trotz mehrfacher Gelegenheit keine näheren 
Angaben über die an ihr bestehenden Beteiligungsverhältnisse 
gemacht. Zusammen mit dem bereits erwähnten Umstand, das über 
die Entgeltlichkeit der am 5. Dezember 2000 erfolgten Abtretung des 
Klageanspruchs (KB 1) nichts bekannt ist, erhärtet dies den 
Verdacht, dass Y. am Klageanspruch nach wie vor wirtschaftlich 
berechtigt ist. Dies wiederum legt die Vermutung nahe, dass die 
Klägerin unter anderem dem Zweck dient, für Y. das mit dem 
vorliegenden Schiedsprozess verbundene Kostenrisiko zu 
minimieren. 
22. Gestützt auf die vorstehenden Erwägungen erachtet es das 
Schiedsgericht prima facie als glaubhaft gemacht, dass die Klägerin bzw. der 
(vermutlich) hinter ihr stehende Y. mit der am 5. Dezember 2000 erfolgten 
Abtretung des Klageanspruchs (KB 1) gegenüber den Beklagten ein 
Verhalten an den Tag legen, das ernsthafte Zweifel erweckt, ob sie dem 
allgemeinen Gebot, nach Treu und Glauben zu handeln, tatsächlich genügen. 
Das Schiedsgericht hält es deshalb grundsätzlich für angezeigt, die Klägerin 
anzuhalten, den Beklagten 1–4 eine Sicherheit für allfällige künftige 
Parteientschädigungsansprüche zu leisten. 
IV.  Betrag der Kostensicherstellung 
23. Da die Anordnung auf Kostensicherstellung begründet ist, hat das 
Schiedsgericht den Betrag einer solchen Kostensicherstellung zu bestimmen. 
24. Das Schiedsgericht ist der Meinung, dass sich der Betrag der 
beantragten Kostensicherstellung vorläufig nur an den mutmasslichen 
Parteikosten bis zum Entscheid über die Zuständigkeitsfrage und den 
allfälligen, von den Beklagten bisher an die Kosten des Schiedsverfahrens 
geleisteten Vorschüssen auszurichten hat. Es lässt sich dabei von der 
Überlegung leiten, dass ein allfälliger Nichteintretensentscheid zugleich 
Endentscheid (Final Award) wäre. Im Falle eines Eintretensentscheids wäre 
über die Kostensicherung im allgemeinen sowie über die Verwendung der 
hierin angeordneten Sicherheiten neu zu befinden.  
25. Für die Berechnung der Höhe der Sicherheit sind – wie vorstehend 
erwähnt – zunächst die von der Beklagten bereits geleisteten Vorschüsse an 
die Kosten des Schiedsgerichts zu berücksichtigen. In diesem 
Zusammenhang stellt das Schiedsgericht fest, dass bisher nur die Beklagten 
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Nr. 3 und 4 einen Vorschuss von CHF 8'750.- geleistet haben und mithin in 
diesem Zusammenhang ein Kostenrisiko eingegangen sind. Nur die 
Beklagten Nr. 3 und 4 haben folglich unter dem Titel Kosten für das 
Schiedsverfahren einen Anspruch auf Sicherstellung je im Umfang von  
CHF 8'750.-. 
Hinsichtlich des mutmasslichen Aufwandes der Beklagten für ihre 
Vertretung bis zum Entscheid über die Zuständigkeitsfrage hat das 
Schiedsgericht die ins Recht gelegten Beweismittel (insbes. Honorarnoten) 
gewürdigt und den bis zum Zuständigkeitsentscheid noch anfallenden weiteren 
Aufwand abgeschätzt. Das Schiedsgericht erachtet es aber auch als angezeigt, 
sich bei der Festsetzung einer Sicherheit für künftige Ansprüche auf 
Parteikostenentschädigung eine gewisse Zurückhaltung aufzuerlegen, 
andernfalls die Gefahr besteht, dass durch übermässig hohe Gutsprache der 
Klägerin die Fortführung des Verfahrens in unzumutbarer Weise erschwert 
werden könnte. 
In Würdigung dieser verschiedenen Aspekte hat das Schiedsgericht 
festgelegt, dass für die Beklagten Nr. 1 und 2 eine Kostensicherstellung von 
CHF 100'000.- angezeigt ist. Für die Beklagten Nr. 3 und 4 sind jeweils  
CHF 100'000.- zu leisten sowie die Sicherstellung des von diesen Beklagten 
an die Handelskammer Ticino einbezahlten Kostenvorschusses, sodass für 
die Beklagten Nr. 3 und 4 der Betrag zur Kostensicherstellung jeweils  
CHF 108'750.- beträgt. 
Der Obmann des Schiedsgerichts hat beim Credit Suisse ein Konto 
unter der Nummer 0251-283831-11-10 (Rubrik „Ticino“) eröffnet, auf 
welches die genannten Beträge bis zum 15. September 2003 einzuzahlen 
sind. Es steht der Klägerin jedoch frei, die Kostensicherstellung auch in Form 
einer Bankgarantie zu leisten, welche im Wesentlichen dem Modelltext zu 
entsprechen hat, der dieser Verfügung beigelegt ist. Eine allfällige 
Bankgarantie ist durch eine Schweizer Bank auszustellen.  
Ferner ist die Klägerin aufgefordert, bei Leistung von Kostensicherheit 
klarzustellen, in Bezug auf welche der Beklagten diese erfolgen. 
Die Kosten des Verfahrens betreffend Sicherheitsleistungen werden im 
Rahmen des am Ende des Schiedsverfahrens ergehenden Kostenentscheids 
mitberücksichtigt (Art. 53 des Schiedsreglements).  
V.  Weiteres Schiedsverfahren 
Das Schiedsgericht geht davon aus, dass die Frage der Zuständigkeit 
ein Beweisverfahren von mindestens einem Tag beanspruchen wird. Die 
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Modalitäten des Beweisverfahrens werden demnächst zwischen dem 
Schiedsgericht und Parteien festgelegt. 
VI.  Anordnung  
Das Schiedsgericht ordnet an: 
1.  Die Klägerin hat bis zum 15. September 2003 den Betrag von  
CHF 100'000.- als Beitrag an die Verfahrenskosten der Beklagten Nr. 
1 und 2 zu leisten und diesen Betrag entweder auf das Konto Credit 
Suisse N° 0251-283831-11-10 (Rubrik „Ticino“) als Kostensicherheit 
zu deponieren oder durch Bankgarantie sicherzustellen.  
2.  Die Klägerin hat den Betrag von CHF 108'750.- bis zum 15. 
September 2003 als Beitrag an die Verfahrenskosten der Beklagten Nr. 
3 zu leisten und diesen Betrag entweder auf das Konto Credit Suisse 
N° 0251-283831-11-10 (Rubrik „Ticino“) als Kostensicherheit zu 
deponieren oder durch Bankgarantie sicherzustellen. 
3.  Die Klägerin hat bis zum 15. September 2003 den Betrag von  
CHF 108'750.- als Beitrag an die Verfahrenskosten der Beklagten Nr. 
4 zu leisten und diesen Betrag entweder auf das Konto Credit Suisse 
N° 0251-283831-11-10 (Rubrik „Ticino“) als Kostensicherheit zu 
deponieren oder durch Bankgarantie sicherzustellen.  
 
Procedural Order No. 3 of 4 July 2008 in an ICC Arbitration with 
its seat in Berne between X. S.A.R.L., Lebanon (Claimant), and  
Y. AG, Germany (Respondent). Sole Arbitrator: Franz Kellerhals.  
I.  Background  
1. Respondent, by submission dated 21 May 2008, filed a Request for 
Security for Costs and sought an order from the Arbitral Tribunal that 
“Claimant be ordered to provide a security for Respondent’s costs in 
appropriate form and for an adequate amount, but for not less than  
USD 300,000.00.”  
2. The Tribunal, by letter dated 26 May 2008, acknowledged receipt of 
Respondent’s submission and invited Claimant to communicate its Answer to 
the Request for Security for Costs until 3 June 2008.  
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3. Claimant, by letter dated 2 June 2008, communicated its Answer to 
the Request for Security for Costs and requested that the Tribunal “dismisses 
Respondent’s Request for security for costs entirely”.  
II.  The Position of Respondent  
4. Respondent maintains that Claimant is in a disastrous financial 
situation, that its liabilities per 31 December 2007 were 13 times higher than 
its assets, that Claimant’s financial situation has considerably deteriorated 
since 2006 and that Claimant is apparently inactive. According to 
Respondent, it only became aware of Claimant’s deteriorated financial 
situation and cash position on 2 May 2008 when Claimant produced its 
balance sheets as of 31 December 2006 and 31 December 2007.  
5. Respondent submits that the Sole Arbitrator has the power to order 
security for costs both under the ICC Rules and under Chapter 12 of the PILS 
as the applicable lex arbitri in this arbitration.  
6. As to the substance, Respondent argues that the basic prerequisite 
for ordering security for costs is “the requirement of a fundamental change of 
situation since the agreement to arbitrate was entered into, which results in a 
clear and present danger that a future cost award would not be enforceable” 
(...). On the basis of the information available from Claimant’s balance sheets 
as of 31 December 2006 and 2007, Respondent concludes that this 
prerequisite is met in the present case, given that those balance sheets would 
reveal that Claimant is manifestly over-indebted and – under Swiss law – 
Claimant would have to notify the judge and deposit its balance sheet.  
III.  The Position of Claimant  
7. Claimant contends that Respondent became aware of Claimant’s 
financial situation not only in May 2008. According to Claimant, Respondent 
has rather been on notice about Claimant’s financial troubles and its 
inactivity for a long time, by all means since receipt of Claimant’s letter to 
Respondent of 3 June 2006 (...). According to Claimant, its financial 
difficulties result “precisely because of the absence of total payment of its 
work as subcontractor in the Project, in particular because of Respondent’s 
ability [sic!] to act promptly vis-à-vis the Z. to have the subcontractor’s 
pending claims dealt with” (...).  
8. Furthermore, Claimant maintains that Respondent, by contributing 
to the advance of the costs of the arbitration fixed by the ICC Court, accepted 
to arbitrate against Claimant although Respondent knew of Claimant’s 
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financial situation. Moreover, by mentioning in para. 13 of the Answer to the 
Request for Arbitration that Claimant “is ultimately controlled by the […] 
family C. [which is] well connected within [country X.] and has excellent 
connections to Z.”, Respondent expressed its satisfaction with the fact that 
Claimant’s shareholders would make sure that any judgment adverse to 
Claimant would be enforced.  
9. With respect to the Arbitral Tribunal’s authority, Claimant does not 
deny that the Sole Arbitrator has, in principle, the power to order security for 
costs.  
10. As to the merits, Claimant argues that an order for security for 
costs is justified “only under very particular circumstances and with the 
greatest reluctance”, in particular, it “should not have the effect of depriving 
a party to have access to justice and to have its case heard” (...). Claimant 
therefore submits that the mere initiation of bankruptcy proceedings or even 
insolvency as such would not justify awarding security for costs. After all, 
Claimant concurs with Respondent in the opinion that “a fundamental change 
in the circumstances since the agreement to arbitrate was entered into […] 
which results in a clear and present danger that a future cost award would not 
be enforceable may lead to the granting of security for costs” (...).  
IV.  Authority of the Tribunal  
11. The Sole Arbitrator notes that both parties accept an ICC arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction and power to rule on a party’s request for security for 
costs.  
12. For the sake of completeness, the Sole Arbitrator notes that, although 
not specifically mentioned in the ICC Rules, commentators consider the 
wording of Article 23(1) of the ICC Rules to be broad enough to embrace 
applications for security for costs.1 Moreover, legal doctrine and practice 
support the view that Article 183 of the PILS, which allows an arbitral tribunal 
to order precautionary or conservatory measures, also extends to orders 
requesting a party to provide security for the opposing party’s legal costs.2  
                                                     
1 DERAINS/SCHWARTZ, A Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration, 2nd ed., The Hague, p. 297.  
2 POUDRET/BESSON, Droit comparé de l’arbitrage international, Zürich 2002, N 610; Zurich Chamber 
of Commerce (ZCC), Arbitration Proceedings No. 415, Fourth Order of 20 November 2001, in Bull. 
ASA 2002, p. 467; Procedural Order No. 14, 27 November 2002, Ad Hoc Arbitration of the Arbitral 
Tribunal in Zurich, Bull. ASA 2005, p. 108.  
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V.  Requirements of an Order for Security for Costs  
13. A precautionary or conservatory measure requires that (i) the claim 
of the applicant is justified (“Verfügungsanspruch”) and (ii) the legal 
position of the applicant to be secured or preserved is in acute danger 
(“Verfügungsgrund”). The right to an order for security for costs thus 
requires that (i) the applicant, in case of success in the proceedings, would 
have a right to being reimbursed for its costs incurred, and (ii) the applicant 
puts forward with a reasonable degree of certainty (“glaubhaft machen”) that 
its possible future claim for recovery would be deprived failing an immediate 
securing of those costs.3  
14. Turning to the first requirement identified in para. 13 hereinabove, 
the Sole Arbitrator notes that Article 31(3) of the ICC Rules grants complete 
discretion to the arbitral tribunal when deciding which of the parties shall 
bear the costs of the arbitration and in what proportion they shall be borne by 
them. However, the Sole Arbitrator also notes that both parties, by having put 
forward similar reciprocal prayers for relief with respect to their costs, seem 
to concur in the opinion that this Arbitral Tribunal should basically apply the 
rule customary in arbitration proceedings conducted in Switzerland, i.e. to 
allocate the costs in proportion to the outcome of the case, taking into 
account the relative success of their claims and defenses.4 Therefore, the Sole 
Arbitrator concludes that the first requirement for an order for security for 
costs is met in the instant case.  
15. Turning to the second requirement identified in para. 13 hereinabove, 
a review of the scholarly writing and published arbitral decisions on point 
reveals that arbitral tribunals sitting in Switzerland are indeed generally 
reluctant in willing to assume factual situations in which an applicant’s future 
claim for recovery of its costs would be in acute danger. In particular, it is 
common ground that the obligation to provide security may not depend on the 
opponent’s domicile as is sometimes the case in court proceedings, nor can a 
request for security for costs be granted merely on the fact that a party’s state of 
domicile is not a signatory to the New York Convention.5  
16. As mentioned above, both parties agree, however, that one of the 
possible grounds (“Verfügungsgrund”) upon which an order for security for 
costs may be granted is if a fundamental change in the circumstances has 
                                                     
3 BERGER/KELLERHALS, Internationale und interne Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz, Bern 2006, 
N 1466, 1467.  
4 DERAINS/SCHWARTZ, op.cit., p. 371.  
5 POUDRET/BESSON, op.cit., N 610.  
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occurred since the agreement to arbitrate was made, which results in a clear 
and present danger that a future cost award would not be enforceable (see the 
quotations from the parties’ briefs in para. 6 and para. 10 above). One of the 
possible fundamental changes in the circumstances may indeed result from 
the opponent’s manifest insolvency at the time of the initiation of the arbitral 
proceedings if the same party was still in good standing when the arbitration 
agreement was made.6  
17. At this point, it must be recalled that security for costs in 
international arbitration is first and foremost an issue about the conflict 
between the (insolvent) plaintiff’s right to have access to arbitral justice on 
the one hand and the defendant’s interest to have a reasonable chance of 
being able to enforce a future cost award issued in its favor on the other. 
Deciding on an application for security for costs is therefore about the task of 
arbitral tribunals to balance these two conflicting interests against each other 
and about determining, on the basis of all relevant circumstances of the case, 
which of them shall prevail over the other.  
18. When dealing with these issues in the context of insolvency, the 
behavior of the party having become insolvent may well have an impact on 
whether security for costs should be granted or not. However, these 
subjective aspects are not the only relevant points to be considered. In 
particular, making an order for security for costs dependant on the condition 
that the insolvent party has deliberately and in view of the arbitration taken 
steps to deprive the other party from recovering its costs would be 
inappropriate. Such an approach would be one-sided, putting all the weight of 
the decision on the (insolvent) plaintiff’s interest to have access to arbitral 
justice. In case of insolvency, it is therefore justified that subjective 
considerations (such as the plaintiff’s behavior) step back and make way for a 
prevailing objective analysis: If there is no reasonable chance for the 
defendant to enforce a future cost award in its favor, an order for security for 
costs must be granted, unless the plaintiff would prove that its financial 
troubles are directly connected to a behavior of the defendant contrary to the 
principle of good faith.  
19. The foregoing applies, however, only if the objective analysis 
reveals that the plaintiff is manifestly insolvent at the time of the initiation of 
the arbitration proceedings. Manifest insolvency may not be readily assumed. 
The opening of bankruptcy would not be sufficient grounds as long as the 
                                                     
6 BERGER/KELLERHALS, op.cit., N 1468 with further reference and N 1472.  
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estate of the bankrupt party has sufficient realizable assets in order to finance 
the arbitration and to honor a future cost award issued against it.  
20. The approach outlined in para. 18 hereinabove is not in violation of 
the plaintiff’s right to have access to arbitral justice. As all legal maxims, this 
principle must be subject to exceptions. Such an exception may be justified if 
– as explained above – a fundamental change in the circumstances has 
occurred since the agreement to arbitrate was made, with the effect that 
access to arbitral justice is no longer allowed unconditionally, but rather 
subject to the requirement of providing security for the other party’s costs.  
21. Put differently: If a party has become manifestly insolvent and 
therefore is likely relying on funds from third parties in order to finance its own 
costs of the arbitration, the right to have access to arbitral justice can only be 
granted under the condition that those third parties are also ready and willing to 
secure the other party’s reasonable costs to be incurred. If those third parties 
are not willing to provide such security, it would be finally up to the insolvent 
party’s creditors to decide how to proceed with the claim in dispute.  
VI.  Application of the Principle to the Instant Case  
22. In the instant case, the four contracts between the parties which 
provide for arbitration under the ICC Rules were made in 1999. There is no 
evidence on record rebutting the assumption that Claimant was in good standing 
at the time. Therefore, if Claimant was insolvent at the time when it initiated the 
present proceedings in 2007, a fundamental change in the circumstances has 
indeed occurred since the agreements to arbitrate were made.  
23. The Sole Arbitrator notes that Claimant’s financial status, as it has 
been described by Respondent in its Request for Security for Costs, has not 
been challenged by Claimant. Indeed, Claimant’s balance sheet as of 
31 December 2007 reveals that its assets were worth LBP 408,712,168 (equal 
to approximately USD 270,000.00) and that the total of its liabilities 
amounted to LBP 5,449,545,161.00 (equal to approximately USD 
3,650,000.00). Thus, it is fair to state that, as of 31 December 2007, 
Claimant’s liabilities exceed its assets by 13 (thirteen) times and that, on the 
basis of a purely arithmetic calculation, its creditors would have received a 
dividend of less than 7.5%.  
24. In addition, the balance sheet as of 31 December 2007 reveals that 
Claimant has only LPB 5,951,169 (equal to approximately USD 4,000.00) 
worth of cash. Moreover, it is unknown to the Tribunal whether and to what 
extent the other assets of Claimant would meet the values entered in the 
balance sheet. Experience shows that, at least in a forced sale, this is 
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normally not the case. The largest part of Claimant’s assets relates to 
“Investment Debtors” (LBP 353,600,730). Assuming that at least part of 
these claims against debtors relates to Claimant’s claims brought against 
Respondent in these proceedings, the Sole Arbitrator must conclude, on the 
totality of evidence before him, that Claimant found itself in a status of 
manifest insolvency when it initiated the present arbitration proceedings, 
meaning that Claimant is not in the position to finance its own costs of the 
arbitration, nor to honor a possible cost award adverse to it.  
25. The Sole Arbitrator also notes that Claimant has not challenged 
Respondent’s remark that – under Swiss law – Claimant would have been for 
a long time in a situation that would require its board of directors to notify 
the judge of its over-indebtedness and deposit its balance sheet, meaning that 
– according to Swiss standards – Claimant would have been under an 
obligation to declare itself bankrupt long time ago.  
26. These determinations contrast with the documents filed by 
Claimant together with its submission dated 2 May 2008. These documents 
certify, inter alia, that Claimant, as of 21 April 2008, was existing and duly 
registered with the relevant register of commerce in Lebanon, that it was not 
under liquidation and not subject to any bankruptcy situation. Therefore, the 
Tribunal must assume that the shareholders and directors continue to keep 
full control over the insolvent and over-indebted company, i.e. there would 
be no official receiver or bankruptcy administrator making sure that 
Respondent (as a new creditor) would be paid for its costs before any 
(further) distributions to the existing creditors of Claimant would be made. 
Therefore, even if Claimant’s funds were sufficient to finance its own costs 
of the arbitration, Respondent would only be able to recover, on account of a 
possible future cost claim, a small fraction (dividend), similar to all other 
existing creditors of Claimant. Claimant has not argued, nor brought forward 
evidence showing that Respondent’s possible cost claim would have priority 
over the claims of its existing creditors.  
27. Moreover, Respondent’s reference to the C. family in para. 13 of 
the Answer to the Request for Arbitration cannot be considered as an 
(implied) waiver of the right to claim for security for costs, respectively, as a 
(tacit) acceptance of Claimant’s financial situation, or as an acceptance that 
the C. family as the shareholders of Claimant would substitute for Claimant if 
the latter would not be in the position to honour a cost award adverse to 
Claimant. There is no firm and binding declaration to this effect on record 
(e.g. in the form of a guarantee in favor of Respondent). Respondent cannot 
be considered bound to Claimant’s mere reference to the good financial 
standing of its shareholders.  
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28. Finally, Claimant has argued that its uncomfortable financial 
situation has occurred due to Respondent’s behavior, i.e. because of lack of 
payment of its work as subcontractor in the Project. While this would indeed 
be a valid reason to refuse ordering security for costs (see above, para. 18 in 
fine), the Sole Arbitrator must conclude that Claimant’s allegations to this 
effect are not “liquid” to be decided at this time. In addition, while it is true 
that awarding to Claimant its claims brought forward in this arbitration would 
considerably improve its balance sheet, there is no evidence on record 
showing that Respondent’s refusal to comply with Claimant’s (disputed) 
claims is the one and only reason for Claimant’s continuing business 
inactivity and over-indebtedness.  
29. Likewise, Respondent cannot be considered having been put on 
notice of Claimant’s actual financial situation by Claimant’s letter to 
Respondent of 3 June 2006 (...). This letter merely informed Respondent that 
Claimant “has ceased to conduct any business activity”, that it has “liquidated 
operating assets, downsized its management and labour structure over the last 
18 months”, and that it would put forward in the next 28 days “a claim 
related to the liquidation of the company and the cessation of its business 
activity”. Nothing in this letter indicates that Claimant was manifestly 
insolvent and/or over-indebted at the time. These facts have come to 
Respondent’s secure attention only when Claimant filed its balance sheets as 
of 31 December 2006 and 2007 together with its submission of 2 May 2008.  
VII.  Conclusion  
30. On the basis of the foregoing, the Sole Arbitrator concludes that 
Respondent’s request for security for costs must, in principle, be granted.  
31. No security seems justified for the USD 48,000.00 already 
advanced by Respondent to the ICC as its share of the advance fixed by the 
ICC Court. Respondent paid this amount voluntarily, although – given 
Respondent’s doubts about Claimant’s financial situation – Respondent could 
have refused to make this advance payment. As Article 30(3) of the ICC 
Rules provides for such case, Claimant would then have been free to 
substitute for Respondent’s share of the advance.  
32. In respect of Respondent’s legal and other costs incurred by it for 
the arbitration, Respondent maintains that it “has already incurred costs for 
legal representation of some CHF 100,000 and expects further legal expenses 
of at least CHF 150,000.” Respondent has not offered specific proof for any 
of these figures.  
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33. According to Article 31(1) of the ICC Rules, the costs of the 
arbitration shall include, inter alia, the “reasonable legal and other costs 
incurred by the parties for the arbitration”. On the basis of all relevant 
information on the case before it at present, the Tribunal deems it just and 
appropriate to fix those costs to USD 150,000.00.  
VIII. Decision  
34. On the basis of the foregoing, the Arbitral Tribunal hereby:  
(a) Decides to order Claimant to provide a security for Respondent’s 
reasonable legal and other costs incurred by it for the arbitration in the 
amount of USD 150,000.00.  
(b) Decides to order Claimant to deposit the amount of USD 
150,000.00 until 10 August 2008 on a trust account to be designated by the 
Arbitral Tribunal in the next few days.  
(c) Decides that the amount of USD 150,000.00 shall be kept in trust 
until such time as the Tribunal shall decide, in an award, on the costs of the 
arbitration and which of the parties shall bear them.  
(d) Decides to confirm the time limits and dates fixed in the 
Provisional Timetable (i.e. in Procedural Order No. 1 of 26 March 2008).  
(e) If the required security is not paid in full until 10 August 2008, the 
Arbitral Tribunal reserves to order the suspension or termination of the 
arbitral proceedings.  
(f) Decides to communicate this Procedural Order to the parties’ 
Counsel by facsimile and mail with a copy to the ICC.  
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Final Award of 20 April 2009 in an ICC Arbitration with its seat 
in Berne between X. S.A.R.L., Lebanon (Claimant), and Y. AG, 
Germany (Respondent). Sole Arbitrator: Franz Kellerhals.  
I.  Introduction  
[...]  
VII.  Costs  
175. [...]. Consequently, Claimant shall be obliged to reimburse 
Respondent for the amount of CHF 000,000.85, corresponding to CHF 
000,000.75 minus CHF 00,000.90.  
176. As Claimant has provided USD 150,000.00 security for costs in 
favour of Respondent (...), and given the outcome of the case by which 
Claimant has to reimburse Respondent for its costs for legal representation 
and assistance (...), the full amount of USD 150,000.00 representing security 
for costs shall be released and transferred to a bank account to be designated 
by Respondent. Respondent shall have to credit these USD 150,000.00 
against its claim for reimbursement of its costs for legal representation and 
assistance (to be converted into Swiss francs at the conversion rate applicable 
on the date of receipt on Respondent’s account).  
VIII. Award  
177. For these reasons, and by applying the ICC 1998 Rules of 
Arbitration, the agreed rules of procedure and Chapter 12 of the Swiss 
Private International Law Statute,  
the Arbitral Tribunal:  
(1) Decides to reject Claimant’s claim for the principal amounts.  
(2) […].  
(3) Declares that Claimant shall bear USD 000,000.00 and Respondent 
USD 0,000.00 of the costs of the arbitration fixed by the ICC 
International Court of Arbitration at USD 000,000.00. As Respondent 
has advanced USD 00,000.00 of those costs, Claimant shall reimburse 
and pay to Respondent USD 00,000.00.  
(4) Decides to order Claimant to reimburse and pay to Respondent CHF 
000,000.85 on account of Respondent’s legal and other costs incurred 
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in the arbitration. Consequently, decides to release the security for 
costs of USD 150,000.00 and to transfer this amount to a bank account 
to be designated by Respondent to the Sole Arbitrator within 20 days 
from the receipt of this final Award. Furthermore, declares that on the 
date of receipt of those USD 150,000.00, they shall be credited to the 
amount of CHF 000,000.85 so that those CHF 000,000.85 shall reduce 
by USD 150,000.00 (to be converted into Swiss francs at the 
conversion rate applicable on the date of receipt on Respondent’s 
account).  
(5) Decides to dismiss Claimant’s request for reimbursement of its costs 
incurred for the arbitration.  
(6) […].  
 
Order No. 1 of 19 December 2008 of an Arbitral Tribunal acting 
under the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration in a matter 
between Claimants 1-2 and Respondents 1-16.  
Reference is made to the requests of Respondents 1-2, 12-14, and 15-
16 that the Arbitral Tribunal order Claimants to secure Respondents’ costs of 
arbitration. Pursuant to the deadline set forth in its email to the Parties dated 
December 12, 2008, the Arbitral Tribunal offers its decision on this matter 
below.  
As the present Order is in fact the first Procedural Order and precedes 
the “Initial Directions and Procedural Order No. 1” provided to the Parties in 
draft for comment on December 12, 2008, the present Order is Order No. 1 
and sets forth certain background to the arbitration prior to addressing the 
petitions for security for costs.  
1. […]  
[…]  
3. Procedural History of the Case  
3.1 Claimants: On January 21, 2008, Claimants commenced the 
arbitration by filing their Notice of Arbitration with the ZCC. On January 23, 
2008, they paid a Registration Fee in the amount of CHF 6,000.00. On 
February 20, 2008, they filed a Complement to the Notice of Arbitration with 
the ZCC. On May 8, 2008, they communicated with the ZCC concerning 
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Service on Respondents 12-14 and the conduct of multiparty proceedings. On 
July 2, 2008, they communicated with the ZCC concerning the designation of 
arbitrators.  
3.2 Respondents 1-2: On June 16, 2008, Respondents 1-2 filed their 
Answer to the Notice of Arbitration with the ZCC. On April 9, 2008 and April 
30, 2008, they requested that the Claimants be directed to file separate notices 
of arbitration with respect to separate Respondents or groups of Respondents 
and that notice be properly served on Respondents 12-14. On June 30, 2008, 
they communicated with the ZCC concerning the number of arbitrators and on 
August 8,2008 concerning the designation of a party arbitrator.  
3.3 Respondents 3-11: On June 16, 2008, Respondents 3-11 filed their 
Answer to the Notice of Arbitration with the ZCC. On April 9, 2008 and April 
30, 2008, they requested that the Notice and Complement to Notice be rejected 
and that notice be properly served on Respondents 12- 14. On June 30,2008, 
they communicated with the ZCC concerning the number of arbitrators and on 
August 8,2008 concerning the designation of a party arbitrator.  
3.4 Respondents 12-14: On June 30,2008, Respondents 12-14 filed their 
Answer to the Notice of Arbitration with the ZCC. On August 8, 2008, they 
communicated with the ZCC concerning the designation of a party arbitrator.  
3.5 Respondents 15-16: On June 16, 2008 Respondents 15-16 
submitted to the ZCC a request for the award of security for their legal costs. 
On June 26, 2008, they filed their Answer to the Notice of Arbitration with 
the ZCC. On April 9, 2008 and April 22, 2008, they communicated with the 
ZCC concerning service. On May 1, 2008 and May 9, 2008, they requested 
that the Claimants be directed to file separate notices of arbitration with 
respect to separate Respondents or groups of Respondents. On June 30, 2008 
and August 8, 2008, they communicated with the ZCC concerning the 
designation of arbitrators.  
3.6 Following the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Parties 
were invited to comment on the quantification of the amount in dispute, the 
provisional timetable, procedural issues, and the appointment of an arbitral 
secretary (letters dated November 20, 2008 and December 5, 2008). 
Claimants submitted comments on December 3, 2008, December 5, 2008, 
and December 10, 2008. Respondents 1-2 submitted comments on December 
3, 2008 and December 5, 2008. Respondents 3-11 submitted comments on 
November 24, 2008 and December 5, 2008. Respondents 12-14 submitted 
comments on November 26, December 5, 2008 and December 10, 2008. 
Respondents 15-16 submitted comments on December 3, 2008 and December 
18, 2008.  
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4. Request for Security for Costs  
4.1 Three groups of Respondents have requested that the Arbitral 
Tribunal order Claimants to secure Respondents’ costs:  
4.1.1 Respondents 15-16 submitted comments on December 3, 2008.  
4.1.2 Respondents 1-2 submitted comments on December 5, 2008.  
4.1.3 Respondents 12-14 submitted comments on December 10, 2008 
and December 18, 2008.  
4.2 Claimants submitted comments on December 10, 2008.  
4.3 The Arbitral Tribunal notes that Respondents 3-11 have not 
submitted a request for security for costs as of the date of this Order No. 1.  
4.4 Respondents 1-2 requested that the Arbitral Tribunal order 
Claimants to secure their costs for three reasons.  
4.4.1 First, Claimants “expressly acknowledge that they do not have 
the financial means available to them to pay the substantial deposit the 
Arbitral Tribunal will be required to request in order to cover the costs of this 
procedure.” According to Respondents 1-2, “this arbitral procedure is not 
likely to continue.” Therefore, it will “save all concerned substantial time and 
effort if the present proceedings are suspended until Claimants have secured 
the costs of the Arbitral Tribunal.”  
4.4.2 Second, Respondents 1-2 contend that they “cannot in good faith be 
required to spend substantial amounts to defend themselves against the claims 
being asserted by Claimants when, pursuant to Claimants’ own pleadings, it is 
evident that Claimants will not be able to compensate Respondents 1 and 2 to 
the extent that costs are awarded to Respondents 1 and 2.”  
4.4.3 Third, Respondents 1-2 allege that the Arbitral Tribunal will find 
that it has no jurisdiction over them, since “in a parallel procedure (case no. 
[...] in which claimants asserted jurisdiction based on some of the same 
documents which are also being relied on by Claimants in the present 
dispute) a 60 page decision rejecting the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision was 
rendered today after more than one and a half years of chaotic arbitration [...]. 
It is hardly to be expected, that things will be easier in this case […].”1  
4.4.4 Respondents 1-2 thus imply that they should be shielded from the 
cost of defending themselves against Claimants’ allegedly unsuccessful claims.  
                                                     
1 Based on Respondent 1-2’s description, it is unclear whether that arbitration involved the same parties 
as in the present arbitration.  
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4.5 Respondents 12-14 allege that “Claimants clearly admit that they 
do not have the necessary funds to finance this multi-party arbitration 
proceeding (...).”  
4.5.1 They therefore requested that the Arbitral Tribunal order 
Claimants to secure their costs because “[o]therwise, Respondents 12 to 14 
would have to pay for their defense without any reasonable chance of ever 
being able to recover these costs.”  
4.5.2 Respondents 12-14 additionally commented that “[]the reason for 
[Claimants’] 1ack of funds is of no interest in the present proceeding, and 
Claimants reference to the Temporary Restriction Order of 11.1.2008 is 
completely irrelevant.”  
4.6 Respondents 15-16 allege that a Temporary Restraining Order 
(TRO) issued in [...] on December 26, 2007 “in effect freezes all assets held 
by Claimants 1-2,” “worldwide.” 
4.6.1 Specifically, “at the date of entering into the limited arbitration 
clauses of January 20, 2000 (as the only conceivable contractual basis with 
Respondents 15-16 [...]), Claimant 1 was solvent and good standing and there 
was no reason for Respondents 15-16 to doubt his ability to pay the costs of 
arbitration in the event he was unsuccessful. However, the financial situation 
of Claimant 1 has significantly changed since January 20, 2000: He and 
Claimant 2 now face substantial allegations of fraud and of misappropriations 
and the [the courts of country X.] has frozen their worldwide assets. Unlike 
in January 2000 there is now no reasonable prospect that Claimants will be 
able to meet the arbitration costs.”  
4.6.2 As a result, “Respondents 15-16 bear the considerable risk not to 
be able to enforce cost awards in their favour against Claimants 1-2.”  
4.6.3 Moreover, “[w]ithout there being an adequate security, 
Respondents 15-16 cannot be required to participate in the present 
proceedings, to defend the various actions of Claimants and/or to address in 
detail the jurisdictional failings of Claimants’ Complaint.”  
4.6.4 Respondents 15-16 assert that “Claimants can only seek to rely 
on their purported contractual right to arbitrate if they provide Respondents 
15-16 with sufficient cost security and thereby reinstate the underlying 
commercial basis of the arbitration clauses at the date when the agreement 
was executed.”  
4.6.5 In this case, “ordering Claimants to secure a future cost award, 
does not unduly deprive Claimants’ of their purported contractual right to 
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arbitrate.” In fact, so Respondents 15-16, “Claimants are solely responsible 
for their current financial position.”  
4.7 Claimants contend that they “have sufficient funds to ensure the 
payment of Respondents costs, if any [...].” Yet “all the Claimants’ assets in 
[country X.]) have been frozen by Court order on Respondents 1 to 11’s (and 
not only Respondents 3 and Y.’s) sole and exclusive initiative.  
4.7.1 However, as concerns assets in Claimant 1’s bank accounts in 
[country X.] or deposits with the firm Z. [country A.] these “were never 
mentioned in the list of assets subject matter of the TRO,” nor could they “be 
frozen or attached through a Foreign Court.”  
4.7.2 Rather, “Respondents 1 to 11 put pressure on the entities 
concerned (...) to prevent them from releasing the funds in their custody to 
their legal owner, [...].”  
4.7.3 Similarly, Respondents 1 to 11 allegedly blocked all Claimants’ 
assets [in country C.].  
4.7.4 As concerns Respondents 15-16, they allegedly “have admitted that 
they still own funds for Claimant 1 that they withhold precisely to guarantee 
their legal costs in the frame of the present arbitration proceedings (...).  
4.7.5 Additionally, Respondents 15-16 allegedly “acted throughout the 
entire chain of events in the core of the present dispute in capacity as owners 
of the various trust entities involved as Respondents 1 to 11 in these 
proceedings [...] they benefit or will benefit of the same advantages as 
Respondents 1 to 11 as regards the freezing/blocking of Claimants’ assets.”  
4.7.6 Claimants additionally state that as a matter of law, “the criteria 
that justify an order for security of costs must be severe.” In other words, 
“[s]uch an order should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances when 
the party against whom the application for security is made adopt a behavior 
contrary to good faith.” In particular, “no security can possibly be obtained – 
and therefore ordered – from the Claimant because it was insolvent: such an 
order would ipso facto deprive the Claimant of its right to submit its claim to 
the Tribunal.”  
4.7.7 Also, “Security for costs may not be required from claimant 
which has little money [...] where the claimant claims that its lacks of money 
is due to the conduct of the respondent.” Claimant alleges that “the situation 
mentioned here mirrors exactly the events in the case under scrutiny [...].” 
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5. Authority to Rule on Security for Costs  
5.1 The Arbitral Tribunal notes that none of the Parties have 
questioned its authority to rule on security for costs.  
5.2 For the sake of good order, the Arbitral Tribunal nevertheless 
identifies the legal bases of its authority as follows:  
5.2.1 Without prejudice to any later decision in the jurisdictional phase 
of the arbitral proceedings on the validity of the Parties’ arbitration 
agreement(s), the Arbitral Tribunal finds that, for purposes of of the 
jurisdictional phase of the dispute, the arbitration is seated in Zurich, 
Switzerland and it is being conducted under the Swiss Rules.  
5.2.2 As the seat of the arbitration is deemed to be Zurich and only 
some of the Parties are domiciled in Switzerland, the arbitral proceedings are 
governed by Chapter 12 of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International 
Law (“PILS”) (Art. 176(1) PILS).  
5.2.3 Pursuant to Article 183(1) PILS, “[u]nless the parties have 
otherwise agreed, the Arbitral Tribunal may, on motion of one party, order 
provisional or conservatory measures.”  
5.2.4 Under a “modern” view (Fourth Order, ZCC Arbitration No. 415, 
November 20,2001, available at 20 ASA Bull. 467, 470 (2002)), security for 
costs is among the provisional measures foreseen by Article 183(1) PILS (id.; 
Procedural Order No. 14, 23 ASA Bull. 108, 112 (2005); Procedural Order 
No. 1, Ad Hoc Case, December 21, 1998, available at 17 ASA Bull. 59 , 63-
64 (1999)); Bernhard Berger & Franz Kellerhals, Internationale und interne 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz 404 (2006); Markus Wirth, Interim or 
Preventive Measures in Support of International Arbitration in Switzerland, 
18 ASA Bull. 31 (2000); Michael Bühler, Grundsätze und Praxis des 
Kostenrechts im ICC-Verfahren, 87 ZVglRwiss 431, 455 (1988); Heinrich 
Honsell et al., Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht: Internationales 
Privatrecht 1538 (1996) (stating that Art. 183 PILS contains no limitations 
regarding the possible substance of interim or conservatory measures and 
suggesting that security for costs fall within the scope of Article 183 PILS)).  
5.2.5 It follows that the Arbitral Tribunal is authorized to grant security 
for costs pursuant to Article 183(1) PILS.  
5.2.5 The arbitration agreement that the ZCC as a prima facie basis for 
the instant arbitration – i.e. the arbitration agreements contained in the 
[Agreement 1], the [Agreement 2], and the [Agreement 3] – all refer to the 
Swiss Rules as the Parties’ agreed institutional rules. Thus, prima facie, this 
B. BERGER, SECURITY FOR COSTS: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SWISS ARBITRAL CASE LAW 
28 ASA BULLETIN 1/2010 (MARCH)  53 
designation is deemed to be an indication of specific party intent as to the 
governing procedural rules.  
5.2.7 Pursuant to Article 26(1) Swiss Rules, “[a]t the request of either 
party, the arbitral tribunal may take any interim measures it deems necessary 
or appropriate.” Security for costs is among the interim measures permitted 
by Article 26(1) (Zuberbühler et al., Swiss Rules of International Arbitration: 
Commentary 347 (2005)).  
5.2.8 It follows that since Respondents 1-2, Respondents 12-14, and 
Respondents 15-16 have requested an award of security for costs, the Arbitral 
Tribunal is authorized to grant this request pursuant to Article 26(1) Swiss Rules.  
5.2.9 In addition to Article 183 PILS and Article 26(1) Swiss Rules, 
Article 182(2) PILS affords a second basis for an award of security for costs. 
Article 182(2) states: “If the parties have not determined the procedure, the 
Arbitral Tribunal shall determine it to the extent necessary, either directly or by 
reference to a statute or to rules of arbitration.” Since the decision to award 
security for costs can be interpreted as a procedural question (Andreas Reiner, 
ICC Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit163 (1989)), pursuant to Article 182(2) an arbitral 
tribunal can determine this issue of procedure “directly” (id.; Procedural 
Decision in ICC Arbitration No. [...], 15 ASA Bull. 363, 370 (1997)).  
5.2.10 The Arbitral Tribunal finally notes that it is widely recognized 
that an arbitral tribunal may award costs even if it ultimately determines that 
it has no jurisdiction over the underlying dispute (Julian D.M. Lew et al., 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 653 (2003)).  
5.2.11 The Arbitral Tribunal finds that it accordingly is authorized to 
grant security for costs even if its jurisdiction to hear the merits of the instant 
dispute has been questioned by all respondents.  
6. Standard applied to Decision on Security for Costs  
6.1 Both under the Swiss Rules and PILS, an award of security for 
costs is appropriate only under exceptional circumstances (Procedural Order 
No. 14, supra; Fourth Order, ZCC Arbitration No. 415, supra; Otto Sandrock, 
The Judicatum Solvi in Arbitration Proceedings (unpublished paper presented 
at ASA on January 31, 1997, p. 17 et sec.); Jean-François Poudret & 
Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Stephen V. 
Berti & Annette Ponti trans. 2007); Wirth at 36).  
6.2 Accordingly, arbitral tribunals and commentators alike find that the 
authority to award security for costs should be exercised only with 
considerable constraint (Wirth at 36).  
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6.2.1 Thus, a mere showing that the arbitral claimant is insolvent or close 
to insolvency is insufficient to warrant an award of security for costs (Decision of 
the Arbitral tribunal, Geneva Chamber of Commerce and Industry, September 
25, 1997, 19 ASA Bull. 745 (2001); Zuberbühler et al. at 358).  
6.2.2 Likewise, the fact that an arbitral claimant has less assets now 
than at the time of concluding the arbitration agreement is insufficient 
grounds to grant security for costs (see Bernhard Berger, 
Prozesskostensicherheit (cautio iudicatum solvi) in Schiedsverfahren, 22 
ASA Bull. 4, 16-17 (2004)). This is true in particular where there is no 
evidence that the claimant consciously secreted or reduced its assets in 
anticipation of the arbitration (see id.; Zuberbühler et al. at 348).  
6.2.3 Nor are an embargo or other events brought about without the 
claimant’s doing grounds in and of themselves to award security for costs 
(Pierre A. Karrer & Marcus Desax, Security for Costs in International 
Arbitration: Why, When, and What if ... , in Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel 339, 346 (Robert Briner et al. eds. 2001)). Rather, it must be 
shown that that there is a “clear and present danger that a future cost award 
would not be enforceable” (Fourth Order, ZCC Arbitration No. 415, supra), 
for instance that there was a fundamental change in circumstances (Karrer & 
Desax at 347, citing to ICC Case No. 10032 (seated in Zurich)). If the freeze 
is only a temporary measure and the possibility exists that a request to 
unfreeze the assets could be filed, then an award of security for costs would 
be unwarranted (see id.).  
6.2.4 In no event should an arbitral tribunal prejudge the outcome of the 
dispute – whether in the jurisdictional phase or the merits phase – in its 
decision to award security for costs (Lew et al., supra at 604 (“To avoid any 
appearance of prejudgment arbitrators are invariably reluctant to express their 
views on the merits before they have considered at least a significant amount of 
the evidence presented by the parties. For this reason the merits of the case 
rarely play any indirect role in determining whether or not interim relief is 
granted.”)).  
6.3 Based on a review of relevant case law and commentary as well as 
of international best practice, the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the following 
factors usefully apply in assessing whether an award of security for costs is 
warranted (see generally Berger & Kellerhals at 402-03): 
6.3.1 First, is the request for security for costs related to the matter in 
dispute?  
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6.3.2 Second, have the petitioners established with reasonable 
probability an impending injury to their entitlement or rights?  
6.3.3 Third, is there a threat of irreparable harm to the applicant if the 
request for security for costs were denied?  
6.3.4 Fourth, are security for costs appropriate in light of the overall 
circumstances of the case?  
6.3.5 As for the last element, considerations such as the existence of a 
fundamental change of circumstances (e.g. where a party’s financial situation 
has significantly and unforeseeably deteriorated since the basic agreement 
between the parties was entered into, see Poudret & Besson at 524; Karrer & 
Desax at 345; in the ICC context, see Michael Bühler & Thomas Webster, 
Handbook of ICC Arbitration 346 (2d ed. 2008)), a violation of good faith on 
the petitioner’s part (e.g. where a party has deliberately become insolvent 
with a view to avoiding the financial risks of arbitral proceedings, see 
Poudret & Besson at 524), the likelihood that an award of security for costs 
would unduly restrict Claimants’ access to arbitral justice (Procedural Order 
No. 1, Ad Hoc Case, December 21, 1998, supra at 65); etc. factor into the 
overall assessment of the appropriateness of awarding security for costs. 
6.4 The party requesting security for costs bears the burden of proof in 
relation to all the facts on which its request is based (Procedural Decision in 
ICC Arbitration No. [...], supra at 377).  
6.5 Accordingly, Respondents 1-2, Respondents 12- 14, and 
Respondents 15- 16 bear the burden of proving all facts on which their 
request is based.  
7. Arbitral Tribunal’s Decision  
7.1 The Arbitral Tribunal denies the requests for security for costs of 
Respondents 1-2, Respondents 12-14, and Respondents 15-16 at this time. 
The petitioners have not shown that exceptional circumstances are present 
justifying a grant of security for costs at this time.  
7.2 Preliminary Findings: 
7.2.1 The Arbitral Tribunal acknowledges the pendency of litigation in 
the [courts of country Y.] (Case No. ...), hereinafter the “Litigation”) 
involving, as Plaintiffs, Respondents 3-11, P., Q., and R. (who is acting as 
Receiver and Manager of the Assets of F. and G.) and, as Defendants, 
Claimants 1-2, Respondents 13-14, and [...]. Neither P., Q., nor R. is a party 
to the instant arbitration.  
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7.2.2 The Arbitral Tribunal understands that Respondents 1-2 are 
represented by M. only by virtue of their status as being in receivership.  
7.2.3 As far as the Arbitral Tribunal is concerned, Respondents 1-2 are 
parties to the Litigation.  
7.2.4 The Arbitral Tribunal takes cognizance of the Oder to Show 
Cause with Temporary Restraining Order issued by the [courts of country Y.] 
dated December 21, 2007, the Order to Post a Bond of USD 1 million issued 
by the [courts of country Z.] dated January 11, 2008, and the Stipulation and 
Order issued by the [courts of country Y.] dated August 1, 2008 (...). 
7.2.5 The TRO enjoins and restrains Claimants 1-2 as well as 
Respondents 13 and 14 (who also are defendants in the Litigation) from 
“taking any action, directly or indirectly, to remove, transfer, sell, pledge, 
assign, destroy or otherwise dispose of certain assets specifically identified in 
Schedule A.” Schedule A enumerates [certain moveable properties and 
immovable property in country A.], furniture, and 6 bank accounts held in 
various Parties’ names. Contrary to Respondents 15-16’s assertions, there is 
no indication that these assets represent Claimants 1-2’s “worldwide assets”, 
nor that any of the assets – aside from the apartment in [country A.] – are 
located outside of [country Y.].  
7.2.6 Claimants have moved for a dismissal or stay of the [country Y.] 
proceedings on grounds of alleged agreement to arbitrate between the parties 
to the [country Y.] litigation (...).  
7.2.7 At this time, the Arbitral Tribunal is not informed of the [country 
Y. court’s] decision on this motion. Yet the Arbitral Tribunal understands that 
should the [country Y. court] decide to dismiss the case, the TRO will be lifted.  
7.2.8 To date the Parties have failed to demonstrate that, as a legal 
matter, Claimants’ assets outside of [country Y.] have been frozen. Claimants 
allege that Respondents 1-11 have exerted “pressure” on banks to freeze 
Claimants’ accounts. However, it has not yet been shown that these banks 
would be unwilling – either de facto or de jure – to transfer assets relating to 
the present arbitration. Moreover, it remains unclear whether Claimants have 
assets outside of [country Y., country A., and country B.].  
7.3 Reasoning relating to decision on request for security for costs by 
Respondents 1-2:  
7.3.1 Respondents 1-2 have failed to establish with reasonable 
probability an impending injury to their entitlements or rights or a threat of 
irreparable harm to them. Nor would it appear appropriate to award security 
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for costs to the petitioners in light of the overall circumstances of the case. 
For these reasons, the Arbitral Tribunal declines to award security for costs to 
Respondents 1-2.  
7.3.2 Respondents 1-2 currently enjoy the benefit of the protection 
established by the TRO. With respect to the value of Claimants’ assets in 
[country Y.], the Respondents 1-2’s litigation costs are secured by the TRO. 
If the [court of country Y.] should decide that there is no agreement to 
arbitrate among the parties to the Litigation and that it therefore has 
jurisdiction over the dispute brought before it, Respondents 1-2 conceivably 
could apply to the [courts of country Y.] for an award of the costs that 
Claimants gave rise to by bringing and prosecuting the instant arbitration.  
7.3.3 Moreover, as the parties that requested the TRO, Respondents 1-
2 should not be able to invoke its effects to request security for costs, 
inasmuch as they brought about the circumstances that allegedly prevent 
Claimants from paying costs in the future.  
7.3.4 As concerns Claimants’ assets outside of [country Y.], since none 
of the Respondents have proven that these assets are frozen de facto or de 
jure, Respondents 1-2 have made no showing that they would suffer either an 
impending injury or a threat of irreparable harm.  
7.3.5 As indicated above, the Arbitral Tribunal shall not prejudge the 
outcome of the dispute in its order or award concerning security for costs. For 
that reason, Respondents 1-2’s implicit assertion that the Arbitral Tribunal 
must find that it has no jurisdiction and its further assertion that there is a need 
to protect them from spending “considerable amounts to defend themselves” 
cannot motivate the Arbitral Tribunal to award security for costs.  
7.3.6 An award of security for costs does not appear to be appropriate 
in light of the overall circumstances of the case. Imposing security for costs is 
likely unduly to restrict Claimants’ access to arbitral justice. By requiring 
Claimants to pay a deposit of CHF 117,032.95, the Arbitral Tribunal already 
is effectively testing Claimants’ ability to fund the costs of this arbitration. If 
Claimants fail to pay the deposit, the Arbitral Tribunal may suspend or 
terminate the arbitral proceedings pursuant to Article 41(4) Swiss Rules. To 
additionally require a payment of security for costs at this time, when there is 
prima facie evidence of a significant restriction on Claimants’ ability to pay 
large sums of money, could ultimately mean that Claimants opt no longer to 
prosecute their case. This restriction on Claimants’ ability to arbitrate the 
case appears to be unjustified.  
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7.4 Reasoning relating to decision on request for security for costs by 
Respondents 12-14:  
7.4.1 Respondents 12-14 have failed to establish with reasonable 
probability an impending injury to their entitlements or rights or a threat of 
irreparable harm to them. Nor would it appear appropriate to award security 
for costs to the petitioners in light of the overall circumstances of the case. 
For these reasons, the Arbitral Tribunal declines to award security for costs to 
Respondents 12-14.  
7.4.2 None of the Respondents have proven that Claimant’s assets 
outside of [country Y.] are frozen are frozen either de facto or de jure. 
Accordingly, Respondents 12-14 have failed to demonstrate their assertion 
that there is no “reasonable chance of ever being able to recover these costs.”  
7.4.3 Moreover, since Claimants have shown that they dispose of 
assets in [country A.] (...), the Arbitral Tribunal deems Claimants to be in a 
position to pay costs, should costs be awarded at a later time in these arbitral 
proceedings. Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal finds there to be no 
reasonable probability of an impending injury or threat of irreparable harm.  
7.4.4 As concerns Respondents 13 and 14, who are Defendants in the 
Litigation, should the [courts of country Y.] decide that there is no agreement 
to arbitrate among the parties to the Litigation and that it therefore has 
jurisdiction over the dispute brought before it, Respondents 13 and 14 
conceivably could be able to cross-claim for an award of the costs that 
Claimants gave rise to by bringing and prosecuting the instant arbitration.  
7.4.5 Even if Claimants’ assets should be frozen world-wide as a result 
of the TRO and even if Respondents 13 and 14 had no opportunity to cross-
claim for damages, the TRO by itself is not sufficient to warrant an award of 
security for costs. The Arbitral Tribunal analogizes the TRO to an embargo, 
which prevents a claimant from paying costs, but which is not sufficient to 
justify a request for security for costs. Accordingly, the existence of the TRO 
by itself does not warrant awarding security for costs. It is not inconceivable 
that the TRO might be lifted in the future or that the [courts of country Y.] 
will allow a lifting of the TRO for purposes of paying costs awarded by the 
Arbitral Tribunal.  
7.4.6 Moreover, an award of security for costs does not appear to be 
appropriate in light of the overall circumstances of the case. Imposing 
security for costs is likely unduly to restrict Claimants’ access to arbitral 
justice. By requiring Claimants to pay a deposit of CHF 117.032,95, the 
Arbitral Tribunal already is effectively testing Claimants’ ability to find the 
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costs of this arbitration. If Claimants fail to pay the deposit, the Arbitral 
Tribunal may suspend or terminate the arbitral proceedings pursuant to 
Article 41(4) Swiss Rules. To additionally require a payment of security for 
costs at this time, when there is prima facie evidence of a significant 
restriction on Claimants’ ability to pay large sums of money, could 
ultimately mean that Claimants opt no longer to prosecute their case. This 
restriction on Claimants’ ability to arbitrate the case appears to be 
unjustified.  
7.5 Reasoning relating to decision on request for security for costs by 
Respondents 15-16: [identical reasoning as under 7.4 less 7.4.4].  
7.6 In sum, the Arbitral Tribunal declines to award security for costs at 
this stage.  
7.7 This decision, however, is without prejudice to a possible 
reconsideration of such a request at a subsequent stage of the arbitral 
proceedings.  
 
Extract from Procedural Order in ICC Case in Geneva  
(April 2009) Concerning Security for Costs, in particular: 
– when requested by a Counterclaiming Respondent and 
– whether coming under Article 182 PILA /Article 23 ICC Rules 
(interim measures) or Article 183 PILA / Article 15 ICC Rules 
(procedure generally) 
Summary of Procedural Background 
1. Disputes relating to a € 12.0 million contract for the sale and 
installation in India of a complex machine for industrial production of 
packaging material were submitted to arbitration in Switzerland. 
2. Prior to completion of the Terms of Reference, and the day after 
receiving a court order in India directing the Claimant in arbitration 
to furnish, within 30 days, a bank guarantee for about € 10.5 million, 
the counterclaiming Respondent in arbitration submitted to the 
Arbitral Tribunal an Application for Interim Measures seeking an 
order that the Claimant provide the Respondent party with (i) a bank 
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guarantee as security for the amount of the counterclaim (About 
€ 10.5 million) and (ii) a bank guarantee as security for costs (for at 
least € 0.55 million). 
3. Claimant requested (i) that the Application for Interim Measures be 
dismissed and (ii) that costs be granted in its favor. 
4. Following modification, the Respondent party’s requests to the Arbitral 
Tribunal were worded as follows: 
(i) To direct Claimant to provide a bank guarantee, issued by a 
leading .... banking institution, in the amount of EUR 10,454,176, 
provided that Claimant has not already provided such a bank 
guarantee pursuant to the court order ...; and 
(ii) To direct Claimant to provide a second bank guarantee, issued 
by a leading ... banking institution, in an amount sufficient to 
cover the costs and expenses of arbitration that may be awarded 
to Respondent-Counterclaimant in these proceedings ..., and 
which are currently estimated provisionally to amount to no less 
than EUR 550,000; and 
(iii) To render any other interim or conservatory relief that it, in its 
discretion, deems appropriate under the circumstances to protect 
Respondent-Counterclaimant's interests; and 
(iv) To deny Claimant's request that Respondent-Counterclaimant be 
required to bear Claimant's share of the costs ... relating to this 
present petition for interim measures. 
Extract from Procedural Order no. 4 (April 2009) 
[…] 
2.3 Nature of the Request for Security for Costs; Applicable Laws 
64. The Terms of Reference confirm that the arbitration proceedings are 
governed by the provisions of chapter 12 PILA, are regulated by the 
provisions of the ICC Rules, and that, pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Contract between the Parties, “all legal relationship in connection with 
this contract shall be governed and resolved by the laws of India/ laws 
of United Kingdom ...”. 
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65. With respect to procedure in general, Article 182 PILA provides (in 
unofficial English translation) as follows: 
1. The parties may, directly or by reference to rules of arbitration, 
determine the arbitral procedure; they may also submit the arbitral 
procedure to a procedural law of their choice. 
2. If the parties have not determined the procedure, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall determine it to the extent necessary, either directly 
or by reference to a statute or to rules of arbitration. 
3. Regardless of the procedure chosen, the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
ensure equal treatment of the parties and the right of both parties 
to be heard in adversarial proceedings. 
66. With respect to interim measures, Article 183 PILA provides (in 
unofficial English translation) as follows: 
1. Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, the Arbitral Tribunal 
may, on motion of one party, order provisional or conservatory 
measures. 
2. If the party concerned does not voluntarily comply with these 
measures, the Arbitral Tribunal my request the assistance of the 
state judge, the judge shall apply his own law. 
3. The Arbitral Tribunal or the state judge may make the granting of 




67. For rules providing particular conditions for granting particular interim 
measures, the Arbitral Tribunal may start from the terms of the Parties’ 
contract and also refer to rules of arbitration determined in accordance 
with the designated lex arbitri (i.e. chapter 12 PILA and in particular 
its Article 182), as well as to legal rules contained in the designated lex 
causae (i.e. “the laws of India/laws of United Kingdom”)3 In addition, 
the Arbitral Tribunal may also look to rules of law in places where an 
                                                     
11 2  
3  See, e.g., Blessing, INTRODUCTION TO ARBITRATION–SWISS AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
(1999), p. 279. See also Besson, ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL ET MESURES PROVISOIRES (1998),  
§§ 441-43; Poudret/Besson, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2nd ed. 2007), 
N. 624; Dutoit, COMMENTAIRE DE LA LOI FEDERALE DU 18 DECEMBRE 1987 (4eme ed. 2005), N. 4 ad 
183; Vischer, ZÜRCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM IPRG, N. 5 ad art. 183; Walter/Bosch/Brönnimann, 
INTERNATIONALE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER SCHWEIZ (1991), p. 132. 
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interim measure might be presented to a national court for enforcement 
(“lex executionis”).4 
68. However, another aspect has also to be taken into account due to the 
two types of relief requested by Respondent in the present instance. 
Under Swiss law for international arbitration, the request for security 
for the counterclaims is clearly a provisional or conservatory measure 
coming under Article 183 PILA.5 However, under Swiss law for 
international arbitration the request for security for costs is subject to 
continuing controversy over its proper qualification as a provisional or 
conservatory measure governed by Article 183 PILA, or as a specific 
procedural measure within the scope of Article 182 PILA.6  
69. Notwithstanding this doctrinal controversy, which will be considered 
further in section 3.2.2.3 below, it can nonetheless be observed that 
provisions of chapter 12 PILA apply in either circumstance. 
Consequently, the basic jurisdiction and power of the Arbitral Tribunal 
to consider a request for security for costs is not in doubt, regardless of 
whether that power is grounded in Article 182 or 183 PILA.  
70. In conclusion on this point, the basic jurisdiction and power of the 
Arbitral Tribunal to consider Respondent’s request for security for 
costs in addition to the request for security for the counterclaims does 
not depend on a determination as to the nature or legal basis for such 
measures.  
[…]
                                                     
4  Wirth, “Interim or Preventive Measures in Support of International Arbitration in Switzerland”, 18 
ASA Bulletin (2000), p. 31 at 33; Vischer, ZÜRCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM IPRG, N. 5 ad art. 183. 
5  Wirth, “Interim or Preventive Measures in Support of International Arbitration in Switzerland”, 18 
ASA Bulletin (2000), p. 31 at 35; Besson, ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL ET MESURES PROVISOIRES 
(1998), § 444; Sangiorgio, DER VORSORGLICHE RECHTSSCHUTZ IN DER INTERNATIONALEN 
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT NACH ART. 183 IPRG (1996), p. 140. 
6  See, e.g., Stacher, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration: Commentary (2005), ad Art. 41 N 24; 
Reymond, “Security for Costs in International Arbitration”, 110 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW (Oct. 
1994), p. 501 at 504; and Berger, “Prozesskostensicherheit (cautio iudicatum solvi) im 
Schiedsverfahren”, 22 ASA Bulletin (2004), p. 4 at pp. 10-11. 
3.2.2 With Respect to Security for Costs 
 3.2.2.1 Introduction 
142. The second prayer included in the original Application for Interim 
Measures requests that the Arbitral Tribunal direct Claimant to provide 
a bank guarantee “for the amount of ICC fees and other expenses 
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which have been and may be incurred by the Respondent in the 
Arbitration”. 
143. The Supplement to the Application modified this request as follows: 
“[that Claimant be directed] to provide a second bank guarantee ... in 
an amount sufficient to cover the costs and expenses of arbitration that 
may be awarded to Respondent-Counterclaimant in these proceedings 
..., and which are currently estimated provisionally to amount to no 
less than EUR 550,000;” 
144. In opposition to this request, Claimant relies principally on a reference 
from Bühler/Webster39 containing extracts from a published arbitral 
decision from 2001 that describes an unpublished arbitral decision 
rendered in Zurich in 1995 under the Zurich Chamber of Commerce 
Rules of International Arbitration. Although itself unpublished, the 
1995 decision thus invoked by Claimant is also described by Wirth.40 
Furthermore, two published arbitral decisions rendered by other Swiss 
arbitral tribunals, one in Zurich (in 2001)41 and another in Lausanne 
(undated, but between 1996 and 1997)42, also describe the same, 
otherwise unpublished, decision from 1995. 
145. According to the description given in the published arbitral decision 
from 2001 (i.e. the same decision quoted by Bühler/Webster as 
referenced by Claimant), the arbitrator in the unpublished decision 
from 1995 had held that security for costs should only be ordered in 
“exceptional circumstances”, i.e. circumstances where there is “a clear 
and present danger that a future cost award would not be enforceable, 
e.g. because of a party’s insolvency as proven by the applicant”.43 It 
may be noted that the unpublished 1995 decision apparently refused 
the request for security for costs, whereas the published 2001 decision 
granted the request on the basis that the claimant party was in 
liquidation proceedings. 
146. An earlier decision from 1996-97 provides another description of the 
reasoning contained in what is evidently the same unpublished 
                                                     
39  Bühler/Webster, HANDBOOK OF ICC ARBITRATION (2005, 1st ed.), § 23-21 at p. 291. 
40  Wirth, “Interim or Preventive Measures in Support of International Arbitration in Switzerland”, 18 
ASA BULLETIN (2000), p. 31 at 36. 
41  Order of 20 November 2001 in ZCC Case no. 415 (Zurich, ZCC Rules), published in ASA BULLETIN 
(2002), p. 467. 
42  Order (undated) in ICC Case (Lausanne, ICC Rules), published in ASA BULLETIN (1997), p. 363. 
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decision rendered in Zurich in 1995. The Arbitral Tribunal notes that 
this earliest published source emphasizes that the ZCC arbitral tribunal 
in Zurich referred expressly in its decision to the (at the time) newly-
adopted Arbitration Rules of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). Under Article 46 lit. b of the WIPO Rules, an 
arbitral tribunal may order the other party to provide security for costs 
(or for a claim or counterclaim) “if it considers it to be required by 
exceptional circumstances”.44  
147. Based on the principle adopted in the WIPO Rules and endorsed by the 
unpublished decision from 1995, Claimant argues in the present case 
that the circumstances are not “exceptional”, and that Respondent has 
not met its burden of proof concerning Claimant’s allegedly imminent 
insolvency. 
148. The Arbitral Tribunal notes that the stated condition of “exceptional 
circumstances” is quite different in nature than the conditions that are 
commonly considered to be applicable to requests for interim measures 
(e.g. “risk of irreparable harm”, “chance of success”, “urgency”, etc. 
...). Moreover, a reference to “exceptional circumstances” makes plain 
that the general rule would be against security for costs, and that a 
grant of security for costs is a recognized exception to the general rule. 
 3.2.2.2 Swiss Arbitral Decisions on Security for Costs 
149. Both Parties referred the Arbitral Tribunal to unpublished arbitral 
decisions concerning security for costs.45  
                                                                                                                             
43  Order of 20 November 2001 in ZCC Case no. 415 (Zurich, ZCC Rules) (Wirth, sole arbitrator), 
published in ASA BULLETIN (2002), p. 467. 
44  The Arbitral Tribunal notes that under the WIPO Rules, security for claims and counterclaims, and 
security for costs, are the subject of a special section within Article 46 of the WIPO Rules that is 
devoted to Security for Claims and Costs. The first part of Article 46 WIPO Rules is devoted to 
Interim Measures of Protection. 
45  Respondent’s example is an ICC decision rendered by an arbitral tribunal in Paris and not 
Switzerland. Claimant’s Swiss example from 1995 has already been described above.  
 Both Parties also referred the Arbitral Tribunal to a partial award rendered in Zurich in ICC Case no. 
8113 (Partial Award of October 1995 (Zurich, ICC Rules), published in ICC BULLETIN (2000), p. 67). 
ICC Case no. 8113 is essentially a case concerning security for claims. However, it also provides an 
example of an effort to combine an accessory claim for costs together with a principal claim amount, 
and requesting security for the entire amount of a prospective award, costs included. The Arbitral 
Tribunal considers that the combination of such requests is not consistent with the ICC Rules. 
Considering the fact that the prospective value of claims for costs are not included by the ICC Court 
in its assessment of the amount in dispute for purposes of the fixing of the advance on costs. 
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150. These references to unpublished decisions are surprising in that the 
Arbitral Tribunal has identified ten published decisions by Swiss 
arbitration tribunals that address requests for security for costs.46 Of 
these ten published decisions, eight rejected the request for security 
for costs.  
151. Three of the oldest decisions simply denied the jurisdiction and power 
of the Swiss arbitral tribunal (in the absence of an express agreement 
concerning security for costs). As discussed in section 2.4.2 above, the 
change of attitude in Switzerland concerning the question of 
jurisdiction and power occurred in the mid-1990s. This shift occurred 
shortly after a widely-felt shock wave caused by the decision from the 
English House of Lords in the Ken-Ren case.47 Since that time, the 
jurisdiction and power of a Swiss arbitral tribunal to order security for 
costs in international cases came to be accepted in principle.  
152. However, of the seven published decisions from Swiss arbitral 
tribunals that accepted the principle of security for costs, only two (one 
rendered in 199848 and the other in 200149) actually granted security 
for costs. And of these two exceptional decisions, one of them 
expressly rejected insolvency – as well as the risk of insolvency – as 
providing adequate grounds for requiring security for costs.50 The 
prevailing circumstance in both successful instances was that the 
claimant party was in bankruptcy proceedings when it initiated the 
arbitration proceedings. 
                                                     
46  Order of 25 June 1956 (Zurich, ZCC Rules), published in REVUE SUISSE DE JURISPRUDENCE (1958), 
p. 92; Order of 12 November 1991 (Zurich, ZCC Rules), published in ASA BULLETIN (1995), p. 84; 
Final Award of 28 February 1994 in ICC Case no. 7047 (Geneva, ICC Rules), published in ASA 
BULLETIN (1995), p. 301; Order (undated) (Geneva, ad hoc), published in ASA BULLETIN (1995),  
p. 529; Order (undated) in ICC Case (Lausanne, ICC Rules), published in ASA BULLETIN (1997),  
p. 363; Order of 25 September 1997 (Geneva, CCIG Rules), published in ASA BULLETIN (2001),  
p. 745; Order of 27 November 1998 (Zurich, ad hoc), published in ASA BULLETIN (2005), p. 108; 
Order of 21 December 1998 (Neuchâtel, ad hoc), published in ASA BULLETIN (1999), p. 59; Order of 
20 November 2001 in ZCC Case no. 415 (Zurich, ZCC Rules), published in ASA BULLETIN (2002), 
p. 467; Order of 19 December 2003 in ICC Case no. 12542 (Geneva, ICC Rules), published in 23 
ASA BULLETIN (2005), p. 685. 
47  Coppée Lavalin SA NV v. Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd (In Liquidation in Kenya), [1994] 
All E.R. 449. 
48  Order of 21 December 1998 (Neuchâtel, ad hoc), published in ASA BULLETIN (1999), p. 59. 
49  Order of 20 November 2001 in ZCC Case no. 415 (Zurich, ZCC Rules), published in ASA BULLETIN 
(2002), p. 467. 
50  Order of 21 December 1998 (Neuchâtel, ad hoc), published in ASA BULLETIN (1999), p. 59. 
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153. Moreover, the Arbitral Tribunal also notes that five of the ten published 
decisions do not even mention insolvency as a potentially relevant 
factor or circumstance, while only three suggested (and by means of 
obiter dicta) that insolvency could provide a sufficient basis for 
ordering security for costs. In contrast, two firmly expressed the 
opposite opinion. 
 3.2.2.3 The Nature of Security for Costs 
154. As noted above in paragraph [66], the nature of a request for security 
for costs is not a settled issue in Switzerland, where the doctrinal 
debate centers on whether the topic is governed by Article 182 PILA 
(procedure) or by Article 183 PILA (interim measures).51 
155. The Arbitral Tribunal also observes that the ICC Rules reflect a very 
similar division between the general procedural provision (Article 15) 
and the specific provision for interim measures (Article 23). Leading 
commentators on the ICC Rules all clearly favour placing security for 
costs under the broadly-worded provision for interim measures (which 
they note is not limited to “the subject-matter of the dispute”), while 
also noting that inclusion of a specific provision concerning security 
for costs was expressly rejected during the revision process that led to 
the 1998 version of the ICC Rules.52 In this connection, it is stated that 
the reason for not having added a specific provision concerning 
security for costs during the 1998 revision was in order not to 
encourage a practice “generally disfavored in ICC arbitration”.53  
156. The answer given to the classification controversy, while clearly not 
determinative of the jurisdiction and power to order security for costs, 
will nonetheless determine the relevant process by which the Arbitral 
Tribunal should seek to identify relevant legal conditions for the 
request. 
157. For purposes of the present proceedings, the classification issue 
addressed in this section has to be considered in the context of the 
Swiss lex arbitri. A first clear answer to the problem under Swiss law 
is revealed by consideration of the situation concerning security for 
                                                     
51  See, e.g., Poudret/Besson, DROIT COMPARE DE L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL (2002), at 549-50 
footnote 348. 
52  See Blessing, INTRODUCTION TO ARBITRATION–SWISS AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1999),  
p. 114; Craig/Park/Paulsson, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2000), 
p. 467-69; Derains/Schwarz, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION (2nd ed. 2005), p. 297. 
53  Derains/Schwarz, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION (2nd ed. 2005), p. 297. 
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costs that prevailed prior to the adoption of chapter 12 PILA. A second 
answer may be drawn from consideration of the consequences of a 
failure to abide by an order to provide security for costs.  
158. Before the entry into force of the Swiss PILA on 1 January 1989, Swiss 
arbitration law reserved interim measures of protection to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of national courts (cf. Article 26 of the Swiss Intercantonal 
Concordat on Arbitration, currently still applicable to domestic 
arbitrations).54 However, during the period when interim measures 
could not be ordered by an arbitral tribunal in Switzerland, parties 
would nonetheless occasionally make requests for security for costs.55 
Such requests were attempted with reference to provisions concerning 
security for costs contained in cantonal civil procedure laws. 
Consequently, security for costs was not considered in such cases as an 
interim measure, but rather was considered as a specific procedural 
question in its own right.56 In the context of arbitration under the Swiss 
Concordat (which formerly applied to both international and domestic 
arbitrations), the issue might be covered either by a specific procedural 
agreement by the parties or by reference to a cantonal code of civil 
procedure.57  
159. A second observation, which in fact is not limited to Swiss law, is that 
an arbitral tribunal can normally enforce its own procedural order for 
security for costs without requiring the assistance of any national 
court.58 The normal sanction for an eventual failure to comply with an 
order for security for costs is a refusal to proceed with the case.59 The 
Arbitral Tribunal considers that this characteristic clearly distinguishes 
security for costs from any interim measure of protection. 
                                                     
54  However, the Swiss Concordat nonetheless allows for consensual arrangements between arbitrating 
parties made upon the proposal of the arbitrators. 
55  See, e.g., Order of 25 June 1956 published in 54 REVUE SUISSE DE JURISPRUDENCE (1958), N. 50 at 
p. 92. 
56  Thus, in a decision dated 22 June 1981, the Zurich Court of Appeals confirmed that in Zurich an 
arbitral tribunal has the power to order security for costs. 
57  Poudret ad Article 30 Concordat N. 1, in Lalive/Poudret/Reymond, LE DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE 
INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE (1988); contra Jolidon, COMMENTAIRE DU CONCORDAT 
SUISSE SUR L’ARBITRAGE (1984), p. 422. 
58  See, e.g., Rubin, “In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash: Security for Costs in International 
Commercial Arbitration”, in 11 AMERICAN REVUE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2000), p. 307 
at p. 315. 
59  For examples from Switzerland, see Art. 95 CPC (Vaud); Arts. 102, 103 LPC (Geneva); Arts. 73, 77, 
78 ZPO (Zurich). 
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160. On the basis of the foregoing, the Arbitral Tribunal considers that 
security for costs is not an interim measure of protection but that it is 
rather a procedural institution which may be determined by agreement 
of the Parties or, in the absence of an express agreement concerning 
security for costs, by the Arbitral Tribunal pursuant to Article 182 
PILA and Article 15 ICC Rules. 
 3.2.2.4 National Laws of Relevance 
161. While national codes of civil procedure are not directly applicable to 
the determination of procedural questions in international commercial 
arbitration, for purposes of making a procedural ruling in the present 
context, the Arbitral Tribunal considers that some relevant information 
may be gained from a review of the situation of security for costs 
under national laws of India, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. 
162. Under Indian law, the Civil Procedure Code provides that the power to 
order security for costs is not regulated under Order XXXVIII 
(discussed above in respect of interim measures), but under the 
separate Order XXV as follows: 
“At any stage of a suit, the Court may, either of its own 
motion or on the application of any defendant, for reasons to be 
recorded, to give within the time fixed by it, security for the 
payment of all costs incurred and likely to be incurred by any 
defendant: 
Provided that such an order shall be made in cases in 
which it appears to the Court that a plaintiff is residing out of 
[the country] and that such plaintiff does not possess ... any 
sufficient immovable property within [the country] other than the 
property in suit.”  
163. Under English law,60 the power of a court to order security for costs in 
judicial proceedings was merged relatively recently into Part 25 of the 
Civil Procedure Rules, which now bears the amended heading “Interim 
                                                     
60  Note that the Arbitration Act, 1996 (England and Wales) is not relevant in this context since the place 
of arbitration in the present proceedings is in Switzerland and not England or Wales. As may be 
expected, however, the power of an English arbitration tribunal to order security for costs comes 
under section 38 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 concerning general powers exercisable by the tribunal 
(“the tribunal may order a claimant to provide security for the costs of the arbitration”). Consistent 
with the distinction between interim measures and security for costs, the Arbitration Act, 1996, 
provides that the power of an English arbitral tribunal to order provisional relief comes under the 
separate section 39 of the Act. 
B. BERGER, SECURITY FOR COSTS: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SWISS ARBITRAL CASE LAW 
28 ASA BULLETIN 1/2010 (MARCH)  69 
Remedies and Security for Costs”.61 The traditionally separate and 
independent nature of security for costs62 is nonetheless preserved by 
means of the separate Section I for Interim Remedies and the 
additional Section II for the topic of security for costs. 
164. [Reference to Part 25.12 and 25.13 CPR] 
165. [In accordance with Part 25.12 (1)(b)(ii) above, reference was also be 
made to § 726 of the Companies Act, 1985] 
166. In Switzerland, the newly adopted Code of Civil Procedure dated 
19 December 2008 (“CPC”) also distinguishes very clearly between 
interim measures and security for costs. All issues pertaining to costs, 
including the advance on court costs and security for the costs of a 
defendant party, will become regulated under Articles 95 to 103 CPC. 
Interim measures will become regulated under Articles 261 to 269 CPC. 
167. In respect of court proceedings, Article 99, para. 1 CPC will provide 
(when it enters into force) that, upon request by a defendant, a plaintiff 
shall provide security for costs in circumstances where: (a) the plaintiff 
does not have a domicile or administrative seat in Switzerland, (b) 
appears to be insolvent (notably by reason of involuntary bankruptcy, 
voluntary liquidation proceedings, or a certificate of insolvency), (c) is 
a debtor for unpaid costs in a previous court case, or (d) for other 
reasons presents a significant risk that it would not pay the defendant’s 
costs following an adverse judgment. Article 100 CPC allows that 
security for costs may be provided, inter alia, by means of a bank 
guarantee. Article 101 CPC stipulates that in case of a failure to 
provide security for costs the claim shall be deemed inadmissible. 
Unlike an order for interim measures, a court order to provide security 
for costs is subject to appeal under Article 103 CPC. 
168. Similarly, but in respect to future domestic arbitration proceedings in 
Switzerland, interim measures and security for costs are also regulated 
under separate provisions. Interim measures will be covered by Article 
374 CPC while security for costs will be covered by Article 379 CPC. 
In contrast to the provision contained in Article 99 CPC for court 
proceedings, the sole conditions under which a Swiss domestic arbitral 
tribunal may order security for costs will be that the respondent party 
                                                     
61  U.K. Statutory Instruments 2000 No. 221, The Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2000 § 13. 
62  For example, under the former Rules of the Supreme Court, security for costs was regulated by Order 
23 and interim remedies by Order 29. 
ARBITRATION PRACTICE – SECURITY FOR COSTS 
70 28 ASA BULLETIN 1/2010 (MARCH) 
requests security for costs and that the claimant party appear to be 
insolvent. 
 3.2.2.5 When a counterclaim is raised 
169. The Arbitral Tribunal also observes that the request for security for 
costs does not distinguish amongst “the costs and expenses of 
arbitration that may be awarded to Respondent-Counterclaimant in 
these proceedings”. Respondent’s estimated amount of at least € 
550,000 does not distinguish any portion solely attributable to 
defending against the claims and thus not attributable to assertion of 
the counterclaims.  
170. The procedural institution of security for costs is for the protection of a 
respondent party (whether as respondent to a claim or as counter-
respondent to a counterclaim). Intricate situations arise when, as in the 
present instance, a request for security for costs is submitted by a 
counter-claiming respondent. 
171. O’Reilly observes (with respect to English law) that “If ... the 
counterclaim is of significant magnitude and the facts which found the 
claim are substantially the same as those which found the 
counterclaim, an order for security against the claimant is 
inappropriate if the respondent is intent on pursuing the 
counterclaim”.63  
 3.2.2.6 Conclusions with respect to security for costs 
172. In light of the provisions of Article 182 PILA and Article 15 of the ICC 
Rules and upon consideration of the foregoing, the Arbitral Tribunal 
concludes that there is no prevailing reason in this case to order 
Claimant to furnish security for costs, and that, even if circumstances 
that could justify such an order were present in this case, Respondent’s 
assertion of counterclaims involving the same facts and issues as the 
claims would cause the Arbitral Tribunal to deny the request for 
security for costs. 
                                                     
63  O’Reilly, “Orders for Security for Costs: From the arbitrator’s perspective”, in ARBITRATION (1995), 
p. 250 (citing a decision of the English Court of Appeal in B.J. Crabtree (Insulation) Ltd. v. G.P.T. 
Communication Systems Ltd., reported in 59 Building L. Rep. 43). 
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Ordonnance de procédure No. 2 du 29 mai 2009 dans l’Arbitrage 
CCI 15951/FM opposant XXX INC., incorporée dans une île des 
Caraïbes (Demanderesse), à YYY S.A., incorporée dans un pays 
d’Amérique latine (Défenderesse). Arbitre Unique: Elliott 
Geisinger.  
Vu: 
– Les articles 7, 10 et 11 de l’Acte de Mission du 17 mars 2009; 
– L’article 23 du Règlement d’arbitrage de la Chambre de commerce 
internationale (ci-après « RCCI ») 
– Les articles 182 al. 1 et 183 de la Loi fédérale suisse sur le droit 
international privé (ci-après « LDIP »); 
– La « Demande de cautio judicatum solvi » de la défenderesse, datée 
du 8 mai 2009 et reçue par l’Arbitre Unique le 15 mai 2009; 
– La « Réponse à la demande de cautio judicatum solvi et demande 
incidente » déposée par la demanderesse en date du 25 mai 2009;  
L’Arbitre Unique rend la présente Ordonnance de procédure No.2: 
1. Rappel de la procédure relative à la demande de cautio judicatum 
solvi et à la demande incidente de la demanderesse: les positions 
des parties  
1.1. Par écriture intitulée « Demande de cautio judicatum solvi », datée du 
8 mai 2009 et reçue par l’Arbitre Unique le 15 mai 2009, la 
défenderesse a pris les conclusions suivantes:  
II. CONCLUSIONS 
PAR CES MOTIFS 
YYY S.A. conclut respectueusement à ce qu’il 
PLAISE AU TRIBUNAL ARBITRAL 
Principalement: 
− Condamner XXX Inc. à déposer des sûretés d’un 
montant de CHF 100'000.- auprès d’un 
établissement bancaire genevois ou en mains du 
Tribunal arbitral. 
Subsidiairement: 
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− Condamner XXX Inc. à déposer des sûretés d’un 
montant fixé par le Tribunal arbitral auprès d’un 
établissement bancaire genevois ou en mains de ce 
dernier. 
1.2 A l’appui de ses conclusions, la défenderesse a fait valoir, en 
substance, les arguments suivants: 
– L’article 23 RCCI donnerait compétence à l’Arbitre Unique de 
prononcer la mesure sollicitée, ce qui serait confirmé par de 
nombreux exemples tirés de la pratique arbitrale.  
– S’agissant des conditions de fond, la partie désirant obtenir une 
sûreté devrait rendre vraisemblable que le recouvrement de dépens 
qui lui seraient par hypothèse alloués dans une sentence serait 
difficile.  
– En l’espèce, cette difficulté serait établie car il existerait des indices 
de l’insolvabilité de la société demanderesse, à savoir: des 
déclarations faites en audience par l’ayant droit économique de la 
demanderesse, qui aurait « tout simplement acheté » la société et le 
fait que la demanderesse a demandé des prolongations de délai pour 
s’acquitter des avances de frais à la CCI. En outre, la défenderesse 
allègue que la seule raison d’être de la demanderesse serait de 
percevoir des commissions. Or, en cas d’insuccès dans l’arbitrage, 
la demanderesse perdrait sa raison d’exister.  
– En outre, la mesure se justifierait au motif que la demanderesse 
serait un simple véhicule juridique offshore, une coquille vide. 
Selon toute vraisemblance, il serait nécessaire d’opérer un 
« Durchgriff » contre l’ayant droit économique de la société. 
– Enfin, les perspectives d’exécution d’une éventuelle sentence 
allouant des dépens à la défenderesse seraient aléatoires, car celle-ci 
a son siège dans un Etat dont l’effectivité de la justice serait sujette 
à caution et qui aurait ratifié la Convention de New York de 1958 
sur la reconnaissance et l’exécution de sentences arbitrales 
étrangère seulement « sous de larges réserves ».  
– Quant au montant des sûretés, la défenderesse estime qu’il serait 
juste de le fixer à CHF 100’000, compte tenu des frais directs que 
prévoit la demanderesse, des honoraires prévus de son conseil, des 
frais liés aux témoins et de la provision d’arbitrage.  
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– Si l’Arbitre Unique devait ordonner la fourniture de sûretés et si la 
demanderesse devait ne pas y donner suite, il conviendrait de 
considérer la demande retirée par application analogique de l’article 
20(4) RCCI.  
1.3 Pour le surplus, référence est faite à l’écriture de la défenderesse datée 
du 8 mai 2009.  
1.4 Par lettre du 18 mai 2009, l’Arbitre Unique a fixé à la demanderesse un 
délai au 25 mai 2009 pour se déterminer sur la Demande de cautio 
judicatum solvi de la défenderesse.  
1.5 Le 25 mai 2009, la demanderesse a déposée une écriture du même jour, 
intitulée « Réponse à la demande de cautio judicatum solvi et demande 
incidente ». Dans cette écriture, la demanderesse a pris les conclusions 
suivantes: 
II. CONCLUSIONS 
PAR CES MOTIFS 
XXX Inc. conclut à ce qu’il 
PLAISE A l’ARBITRE UNIQUE 
1.  Rejeter la demande de dépôt de sûretés de YYY S.A. 
avec suite de frais et dépens. 
Subsidiairement: 
2. Condamner YYY S.A. à déposer des sûretés d’un 
montant fixé par le Tribunal arbitral, mais au moins 
équivalente à celles demandées à XXX Inc., auprès 
d’un établissement bancaire genevois ou en mains du 
Tribunal arbitral.  
1.6 A l’appui de ses conclusions, la demanderesse a fait valoir, en 
substance, les arguments suivants:  
– L’article 23 RCCI ne donnerait pas compétence à l’Arbitre Unique 
de prononcer la mesure sollicitée; pareille compétence suppose 
l’accord des parties (qui fait défaut en l’espèce).  
– Même à supposer que l’article 183 LDIP donnerait cette 
compétence à l’Arbitre Unique, la demande de cautio judicatum 
solvi devrait être formée en début de procédure, de manière à 
permettre à la partie demanderesse de connaître rapidement les frais 
auxquels elle risque de s’exposer en poursuivant sa demande. La 
ARBITRATION PRACTICE – SECURITY FOR COSTS 
74 28 ASA BULLETIN 1/2010 (MARCH) 
demanderesse se réfère aux commentateurs de la Loi de procédure 
civile genevoise sur ce point et considère que le même principe 
serait applicable en arbitrage international. Or, en l’espèce la 
demande de cautio judicatum solvi a été formée alors que la 
demanderesse avait déjà exposé des frais. Par conséquent, la 
demande serait tardive et, partant, irrecevable.  
– La défenderesse s’appuierait sur des allégations non établies 
s’agissant de la situation financière de la demanderesse. Par 
ailleurs, la forme juridique et le siège social de la demanderesse 
étaient connus de la défenderesse au moment de conclure la 
convention d’arbitrage, de sorte que la défenderesse ne saurait en 
tirer argument aujourd’hui.  
– Subsidiairement, pour le cas où l’Arbitre Unique devait ordonner la 
mesure sollicitée, la demanderesse a fait valoir que ses propres 
chances de succès pour faire exécuter en [pays d’Amérique latine 
où la défenderesse a son siège] une sentence condamnant la 
défenderesse aux frais de l’arbitrage seraient aléatoires, de sorte 
qu’il se justifierait d’ordonner la fourniture d’une garantie au moins 
équivalente par la défenderesse.  
1.7 Pour le surplus, référence est faite à l’écriture de la demanderesse datée 
du 25 mai 2009.  
1.8 L’Arbitre Unique n’a pas invité la défenderesse à se déterminer sur la 
demande incidente. Pour la raison exposée au chap. 3 ci-dessous, 
pareille détermination s’avère superflue.  
2. Considérants a propos de la demande de Cautio judicatum solvi 
sollicitée par la défenderesse  
2.1 Quand bien même il n’existe aucune disposition du RCCI ou de la 
LDIP relative aux demandes de cautio judicatum solvi, il ne fait aucun 
doute que pareille mesure fait partie des décisions que des arbitres 
siégeant en Suisse sous le RCCI sont habilités à prononcer.1 De même, 
                                                     
1 Ainsi: Ordonnance de procédure rendue le 19 décembre 2003 dans l’arbitrage CCI 12542/EC, Bulletin 
ASA 23 (2005), pp. 690-693 ch. 34-38 et références; Ordonnance de procédure rendue le 27 
novembre 2002 dans un arbitrage ad hoc, Bulletin ASA 23 (2005), p. 112 ch. 4.1; Sentence CCI 
rendue le 21 décembre 1998, Bulletin ASA (1999), p. 63, ch. 7; WIRTH, Interim or preventive 
measures in support of international arbitration in Switzerland, Bulletin ASA 18 (2000), p. 36. 
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il n’est plus contesté que l’article 23 RCCI donne la compétence et le 
pouvoir aux arbitres d’ordonner ce type de mesure.2  
2.2 Toutefois, la pratique montre une certaine retenue dans l’octroi de ces 
mesures.3 En effet, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que le RCCI impose au 
demandeur comme seule charge financière le paiement des frais 
d’enregistrement et de la provision d’arbitrage (cette dernière étant 
généralement supportée à parts égales par les parties).4 Par ailleurs, 
l’article 31(3) RCCI accorde aux arbitres un très large pouvoir 
d’appréciation pour la répartition des frais dans la sentence finale. Si la 
règle selon laquelle la partie qui succombe supporte les frais est 
largement suivie, c’est avec de très nombreuses nuances et exceptions. 
Il n’est donc pas certain que le demandeur dont la demande est rejetée 
sera condamné aux frais.5  
2.3 Enfin – et ce point est décisif – une partie qui entre dans une relation 
contractuelle avec un partenaire dont la solidité financière n’est pas 
garantie prend un risque, y compris celui de ne pas recouvrer des 
dépens en cas de litige. Il se justifie d’ordonner des mesures destinées 
à pallier ce risque uniquement s’il a augmenté entre la conclusion du 
contrat et le procès arbitral de façon considérable et imprévisible.6  
2.4 En l’espèce, aucune des circonstances alléguées par la défenderesse ne 
pouvait lui être inconnue au moment de la conclusion des contrats 
litigieux. La défenderesse n’affirme du reste pas le contraire, tout 
comme elle n’allègue pas qu’il y aurait eu un changement fondamental 
et imprévisible dans la situation financière de la demanderesse entre 
2000 et 2009.  
                                                     
2 Ainsi: Sentence CCI rendue le 21 décembre 1998, précitée, p. 62, ch. 5-6; CRAIG / PARK / PAULSSON, 
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 3ème éd. 2000, § 26.05 pp. 467-468; DERAINS / 
SCHWARTZ, A Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration, 3ème éd. 2005, p. 297. 
3 Voir l’Ordonnance de procédure rendue le 27 novembre 2002 dans un arbitrage ad hoc, précitée; 
CRAIG / PARK / PAULSSON, op. cit., § 26.05 p. 467; DERAINS / SCHWARTZ, op. cit., p. 297. 
4 CRAIG / PARK / PAULSSON, op. cit., § 26.05 pp. 468-469. 
5 CRAIG / PARK / PAULSSON, op. cit., § 26.05 p. 469. 
6 Voir Ordonnance de procédure rendue le 19 décembre 2003 dans l’arbitrage CCI 12542/EC, précitée, 
p. 694 ch. 44; POUDRET / BESSON, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, 2ème éd. 2007, ch. 
610, qui considèrent qu’une détérioration importante et imprévisible de la situation financière 
constitue le « critère décisif »; VEIT, Note – Procedural Order No. 14 of 27 November 2002, Bulletin 
ASA 23 (2005), p. 116, pour qui ce principe est le « dénominateur commun de la pratique arbitrale 
internationale » en la matière. Voir également BÜHLER / WEBSTER, Handbook of ICC Arbitration, 
2005, ch. 23-22. L’Arbitre Unique relève que exemples cités par BERGER, Prozesskostensicherheit 
(cautio iudicatum solvi) im Schiedsverfahren, Bulletin ASA 22 (2004), pp. 15-16, ont en commun que 
les circonstances ayant justifié la cautio iudicatum solvi sont survenues après la conclusion du contrat. 
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2.5 Cette première considération justifie à elle seule le rejet de la requête 
de la défenderesse.  
2.6 En outre, les éléments factuels que la défenderesse avance comme 
indices d’une insolvabilité n’emportent pas conviction:  
– Le seul fait que la demanderesse est une société « simplement 
achetée » par son actuel ayant droit et incorporée dans une 
juridiction offshore ne signifie pas qu’elle est financièrement 
incapable de faire face à ses obligations. Il existe en effet de 
nombreuses sociétés incorporées dans ces Etats avec des ressources 
financières importantes. Autre est la question de savoir si l’ayant 
droit économique de la société est prêt à laisser le substrat financier 
de celle-ci garantir les dettes sociales: ce sujet concerne la 
problématique traitée au paragraphe précédent.  
– La demande de prolongation de délai pour le paiement de la 
provision d’arbitrage n’a aucune signification: les motifs de la 
demande peuvent être multiples et sans relation avec la situation 
financière de la demanderesse.  
2.7 Ce second motif justifie également, et indépendamment du premier, le 
rejet de la demande de cautio judicatum solvi.  
2.8 Enfin, on peut imaginer d’autres circonstances, exceptionnelles, dans 
lesquelles une cautio pourrait se justifier (p.ex., le fait que le 
demandeur a déjà été condamné à des dépens dans d’autres procédures 
mais ne s’en acquitte pas). Toutefois, la défenderesse n’a ni allégué ni 
établie l’existence de pareille situation.  
3. Considérants a propos de la demande incidente sollicitée par la 
démanderesse  
3.1 La demande incidente de la demanderesse est clairement subordonnée 
à la condition que l’Arbitre Unique ordonne la mesure sollicitée par la 
défenderesse. Comme tel n’est pas le cas, la demande incidente devient 
sans objet. 
* * * 
4. Dispositif  
4.1 Pour ces motifs, l’Arbitre Unique:  
1. Rejette la demande de cautio judicatum solvi formée le 8 mai 
2009 par YYY S.A.; 
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2. Déclare sans objet la « demande incidente » formée par XXX Inc. 
le 25 mai 2009; 
3. Réserve la décision sur les dépens pour une sentence ultérieure.  
 
Entscheid des Appellationshofes des Kantons Bern,  
1. Zivilkammer, vom 22. Mai 2009 in der Streitsache zwischen X. 
(Beklagter/Beschwerdeführer) und Y. (Kläger/Beschwerdegegner).  
befunden und erwogen:  
I.  
1. Mit Entscheid des Schiedsgerichts Y. c. X. vom 9. Februar 2009 
wurde auf das Gesuch des Beklagten/Beschwerdeführers (nachfolgend 
Beschwerdeführer) vom 18. Dezember 2008 um Anordnung einer 
Prozesskostensicherheit nicht eingetreten. Die Kosten dieses Entscheids 
wurden zur Hauptsache geschlagen (...).  
2. Gegen diesen Schiedsspruch erhob der Beschwerdeführer mit 
Eingabe vom 11. März 2009 (...) Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde und beantragte 
Folgendes:  
,,Es sei festzustellen, dass das Schiedsgericht für die Anordnung einer 
Prozesskostensicherheit zuständig ist und die Sache sei zur Behandlung des 
entsprechenden Gesuchs vom 18.12.08 an das Schiedsgericht 
zurückzuweisen.  
Eventualiter: Der Entscheid des Schiedsgerichts vom 9. Februar 2009 
betreffend Gesuch um Prozesskostensicherheit sei aufzuheben und der 
Beschwerdegegner sei zu verurteilen, die dem Beschwerdeführer 
entstehenden Prozesskosten – Anwalts- und Gerichtskosten –, in gerichtlich 
zu bestimmender Höhe beim Schiedsgericht zu hinterlegen.  
– unter Kosten- und Entschädigungsfolge –“ 
Weiter stellte der Beschwerdeführer in seinem Begleitschreiben zur 
Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde den Antrag, der Beschwerde die aufschiebende 
Wirkung i.S. von Art. 38 KSG zu erteilen.  
3. Mit Verfügung der Referentin der 1. Zivilkammer des 
Appellationshofs des Kantons Bern vom 24. März 2009 (...) wurde der 
Beschwerde antragsgemäss die aufschiebende Wirkung erteilt.  
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4. Der Kläger/Beschwerdegegner (nachfolgend Beschwerdegegner) 
schliesst in seiner Stellungnahme vom 6. April 2009 (...) auf vollumfängliche 
Abweisung des Haupt- wie auch des Eventualantrags des Beschwerdeführers.  
5. Der Appellationshof ist gemäss Art. 36 lit. b i.V.m. Art. 3 lit. f KSG 
und Art. 380 Abs. 2 ZPO sachlich, örtlich und funktionell zuständig, so dass 
auf die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde materiell einzutreten ist.  
II.  
1. vorliegend ist Prozessthema, ob das Schiedsgericht zur 
zwangsweisen Anordnung einer anbegehrten Prozesskostensicherheit 
sachlich zuständig ist.  
Das Schiedsgericht führte dazu aus, der Beschwerdeführer verlange die 
Sicherstellung eines allfälligen künftigen Anspruches gegen den 
Beschwerdegegner auf Ersatz der ihm durch das Schiedsverfahren 
entstehenden ersatzfähigen Kosten. Die anbegehrte Kautionsverfügung diene 
der Sicherung allfälliger künftiger Ansprüche und sei damit als 
Sicherungsmassnahme und als vorsorgliche Massnahme i.S.v. Art. 26 KSG 
zu qualifizieren. Gemäss Art. 26 Abs. 1 KSG seien zur Anordnung 
vorsorglicher Massnahmen alleine die staatlichen Gerichte zuständig. Den 
Parteien sei es indessen unbenommen, sich im Rahmen des 
schiedsgerichtlichen Verfahrens den vorgeschlagenen vorsorglichen 
Massnahmen freiwillig zu unterziehen. Da sich der Beschwerdegegner der 
anbegehrten Massnahme widersetze, sei nach dem Gesagten deren 
Anordnung im Schiedsverfahren nicht möglich. Mangels Zuständigkeit des 
Schiedsgerichts sei damit auf das Gesuch um Anordnung einer 
Prozesskostensicherheit vom 18. Dezember 2008 nicht einzutreten. 
2. Demgegenüber macht der Rechtsvertreter des Beschwerdeführers im 
Wesentlichen geltend, es werde nicht bestritten, dass Art. 26 Abs. 2 KSG 
(recte: Art. 26 Abs. 1 KSG) unmissverständlich festlege, dass für 
vorsorgliche Massnahmen alleine die staatlichen Gerichte zuständig seien. 
Allerdings stelle sich die Frage, was unter dem Begriff der vorsorglichen 
Massnahme zu verstehen sei. Die vorsorgliche Massnahme diene der 
Sicherung des Streitgegenstandes, definiert durch die gestellten 
Rechtsbegehren, währenddem das Institut der Prozesskostensicherheit dazu 
diene, einen allfälligen Anspruch der gesuchstellenden Partei auf Ersatz der 
ihr durch das Verfahren entstandenen Kosten zu sichern. Genau diese Kosten 
würden nicht als Streitgegenstand gelten; sie würden denn bei der 
Berechnung des Streitwertes auch nicht berücksichtigt. Das Schiedsgericht 
habe damit das Gesuch um Prozesskostensicherheit fälschlicherweise als 
vorsorgliche Massnahme qualifiziert und sich zu Unrecht als nicht zuständig 
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erklärt. Schliesslich sei das Gesuch um Anordnung einer 
Prozesskostensicherheit auch inhaltlich begründet. 
3. Die Rechtsvertreterin des Beschwerdegegners bringt im 
Wesentlichen vor, selbst wenn sich die Vorinstanz zu Unrecht als nicht 
zuständig bezeichnet haben sollte, ändere dies nichts daran, dass der 
Beschwerdeführer vom Beschwerdegegner gestützt auf Art. 70 Abs. 1 Ziff. 2 
ZPO i.V.m. Art. 26 KSG keine Prozesskostensicherheit mehr verlangen 
könne, da sein diesbezügliches Gesuch vom 18. Dezember 2008 verspätet sei 
bzw. er hierauf mit Einreichung seiner Klageantwort endgültig verzichtet 
habe. Auch gestützt auf Art. 70 Abs. 1 Ziff. 1 ZPO könne der 
Beschwerdeführer vom Beschwerdegegner keine Leistung einer 
Prozesskostensicherheit verlangen, da der Beschwerdeführer seinen 
Wohnsitz nachweisbar in der Schweiz habe. Im Übrigen sei das Gesuch um 
Leistung einer Prozesskostensicherheit auch materiell nicht begründet. 
III.  
1. Der einstweilige Rechtsschutz ist umfassender oder beschränkter, 
jedoch immer provisorischer richterlicher Schutz der Rechtspositionen von 
Kläger und/oder Beklagten zur Abwehr der Nachteile, die den Parteien aus 
der Dauer des Verfahrens bis zum definitiven Rechtsschutz entstehen 
können. Als vorsorgliche Massnahmen gelten insbesondere auch 
Sicherungsmassnahmen, die der Vollstreckung eines künftigen Urteils dienen 
(vgl. ISAAK MEIER, Grundlagen des einstweiligen Rechtsschutzes, Zürich 
1983, S. 7). 
Währenddem das kantonale Recht einstweilige Verfügungen unter den 
Voraussetzungen von Art. 326 ZPO zulässt, ist die Sicherung von 
Geldforderungen bundesrechtlich abschliessend durch das Institut des Arrests 
gemäss Art. 271 ff. SchKG geregelt. 
Sowohl ZPO wie SchKG räumen dem Gericht die Möglichkeit ein, 
vorsorgliche Massnahmen von einer Sicherheitsleistung durch den 
Gesuchsteller abhängig zu machen (Art. 329 ZPO; Art. 273 Abs. 1 SchKG).  
2. Die Arrestkaution ist ihrem Wesen nach eine Sicherungsmassnahme, 
denn über die Haftpflicht des Arrestgläubigers wird frühestens nach 
rechtskräftiger Erledigung des Arrestaufhebungs- oder 
Arrestprosequierungsprozesses endgültig entschieden. Der Auflage einer 
Arrestkaution kommt daher selbst notwendigerweise der Charakter einer 
einstweiligen Verfügung zu (vgl. ERNST MEIER, Die Sicherheitsleistung des 
Arrestgläubigers [Arrestkaution] gemäss SchKG 273 I, Dissertation der 
Rechts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Zürich, Zürich 
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1978, S. 48). Nichts anderes kann aufgrund der identischen Rechtsnatur für 
eine Kautionsauflage gemäss Art. 329 ZPO gelten.  
3. Wenn nun aber eine Sicherheitsleistung für Ansprüche des 
materiellen Rechts als einstweilige Verfügung und damit als vorsorgliche 
Massnahme qualifiziert wird, so muss dies auch für die 
Prozesskostensicherheitsleistung gemäss Art. 70 ZPO gelten. Über deren 
Aushändigung an den Beklagten wird nämlich erst nach rechtkräftiger 
Erledigung der Sache selbst und Feststellung der Prozesskostenersatzpflicht 
endgültig entschieden. Mithin ist der Bezugsgegenstand zwar ein anderer als 
bei den vorsorglichen Massnahmen, welche den Streitgegenstand an sich 
betreffen, wird doch die Sicherung des allfällig entstehenden Anspruchs auf 
Ersatz der Prozesskosten des Beklagten verlangt. Indessen ist der Sinn und 
Zweck der Massnahme genau der gleiche, nämlich die provisorische 
Sicherung eines künftigen Anspruchs.  
4. Art. 26 Abs. 1 KSG ist mit dem Titel „vorsorgliche Massnahmen“ 
überschrieben, ohne diese nach dem Bezugsgegenstand einzuschränken. Wie 
der Beschwerdeführer unter Zitierung von BERGER/KELLERHALS, 
Internationale und interne Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz, Bern 2006, 
N 1127 selbst ausführt, werden vorsorgliche Massnahmen i.S. von Art. 26 
Abc. 1 KSG als Anordnungen definiert, welche dazu dienen, während des 
Verfahrens die umstrittenen Ansprüche der Parteien von Bedrohung zu 
schützen, die Durchsetzung der beantragten Rechtsbegehren zu sichern oder 
die Beziehungen unter den Streitparteien vorläufig zu regeln. Der 
Kostenschluss ist nun ohne weiteres als ein eigenständiges Rechtsbegehren 
zu qualifizieren. So hat denn der Beklagte anlässlich seiner Klageantwort 
auch den Antrag auf Ersatz der Verfahrenskosten gestellt (...). Damit ist 
dargelegt, dass auch eine Prozesskostensicherheitsleistung eine vorsorgliche 
Massnahme im Sinne von Art. 26 KSG darstellt.  
Demnach ist die Vorinstanz mangels sachlicher Zuständigkeit gestützt 
auf den eindeutigen Wortlaut von Art. 26 Abc. I KSG zu Recht nicht auf das 
Gesuch des Beschwerdeführers zur Leistung einer Prozesskostensicherheit 
eingetreten. Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde ist daher abzuweisen. 
IV. 
Bei diesem Verfahrensausgang hat der Beschwerdeführer die gesamten 
Gerichtskosten des Nichtigkeitsbeschwerdeverfahrens zu tragen und dem 
Beschwerdegegner eine Parteientschädigung zu leisten (Art. 57 ff. ZPO). Die 
oberinstanzlichen Gerichtskosten, bestimmt auf CHF 500.00, werden daher 
dem Beschwerdeführer zur Bezahlung auferlegt und dem von ihm geleisteten 
Kostenvorschuss entnommen. Der Beschwerdeführer wird zudem verurteilt, 
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dem Beschwerdegegner für das oberinstanzliche Verfahren einen 
Parteikostenersatz auszurichten. Dessen Höhe wird nach Eingang der 
Kostennote von Rechtsanwältin A. mit separater Verfügung bestimmt.  
Aus diesen Gründen wird erkannt: 
1. Die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde wird abgewiesen.  
2. Die oberinstanzlichen Parteikosten, bestimmt auf CHF 500.00, werden 
dem Beschwerdeführer zur Bezahlung auferlegt und dem von ihm 
geleisteten Kostenvorschuss entnommen.  
3. Der Beschwerdeführer wird verurteilt, dem Beschwerdegegner für das 
oberinstanzliche Verfahren einen Parteikostenersatz auszurichten. 
Dessen Höhe wird nach Eingang der Kostennote von A. mit separater 
Verfügung bestimmt.  
4. Den Parteien zu eröffnen, dem Schiedsgericht Y. c. X. schriftlich 
mitzuteilen. 
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